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1 Introduction
Asymmetric information is pervasive in long-term relationships; meanwhile, learning often takes
place during the interactions between different parties. For instance, venture capital (VC) firms
face asymmetric information in their investments: startups often have better information about the
odds of success of their projects than the investors. Moreover, due to the private benefits from
receiving continuous funding,1 startups are willing to pursue projects that are less viable than VCs
are willing to invest in. VCs, upon agreeing to finance a startup, receive periodical performance
reports (subscription growth, number of patents, media and user reviews, etc.) from the startup.
These reports may provide information about the viability of the startup. However, the startup
may undertake hidden actions to inflate the performance report, tampering with its informativeness.
Examples include Uber and Lyft who periodically announce their numbers of users and could inflate
such statistics by specialized promotions, and Luckin Coffee and Theranos who have been under
investigation for faking key performance data.
We analyze learning problems with asymmetric information and hidden actions, and investigate
the equilibrium learning dynamics. In our model, a principal (VC) and an agent (startup) are engaged
in a relationship that takes place in continuous time. Performance reports are modeled as public
signals evolving according to a Brownian motion whose drift depends on the agent’s type and action.
If the agent is an investible type, then the drift is µ>0; if the agent is a noninvestible type, then
the drift is 0 by default, but the agent can take a costly action to boost the drift to µ. The principal
receives opportunities to terminate the relationship according to a Poisson process, and chooses
whether to terminate the relationship whenever such an opportunity arises. The signals serve only
an informational role, and do not affect the principal’s payoffs. The principal prefers to continue the
relationship with the investible type and to terminate the relationship against the noninvestible type.
We study Markov equilibria of this game where the state variable is the public belief that the
agent is a noninvestible type. We call the complementary probability, i.e., the probability that the
agent is an investible type, the agent’s reputation. Our first result establishes the existence and
uniqueness of Markov equilibrium.
In the unique equilibrium, the principal’s termination strategy has a cutoff structure — the
principal terminates the relationship if and only if the agent’s reputation is below a threshold. The
agent’s equilibrium strategy depends on the magnitude of his discount rate. If his discount rate
is greater than a cutoff (i.e., if he does not care much about the future), then he never engages in
1 An extreme example is the former CEO of WeWork, Adam Neumann, who allegedly purchased a corporate
jet with the company’s money for personal use.
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costly performance boosting. If his discount rate is less than the cutoff, then the agent does not
engage in performance boosting when his reputation is very low or very high, but will do so for
intermediate reputation. In particular, the intensity of performance boosting is hump-shaped in the
agent’s reputation and peaks at the principal’s termination cutoff.
Our first qualitative finding concerns the relationship between the agent’s reputation and the ex-
pected performance, measured by the expected drift of the signal from an outsider’s perspective. If the
agent’s discount rate is large enough that he never engages in performance boosting, then the expected
performance is increasing in the agent’s reputation. However, for lower discount rates such that the
agent engages in some performance boosting, we find that the expected performance is not monotone
in the agent’s reputation. Starting from an initial high reputation, as the agent’s reputation deteriorates,
the expected performance first declines, reaching a local minimum, and then it rises, reaching a local
maximum precisely at the principal’s termination cutoff, and decreases again thereafter (see Figure
3). This finding may help explain why some startups deliver impressive performance reports, such as
large sales growth (e.g., Luckin Coffee), extraordinary revenue flow (e.g., Theranos) or rapid expan-
sion (e.g., WeWork), right before investors pull their funds. It is also consistent with the observation
that growing market suspicion and strong (expected) performance can coexist for a period of time.
Our second qualitative result concerns the relationship between the amount of information
transmission and the transparency of the performance measure. Performance reports are imperfect
signals of the agent’s type and action, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the process can capture its
transparency. In reality, differences in disclosure standards can lead to differences in transparency.
We investigate how the principal’s equilibrium payoff changes with the signal-to-noise ratio, and
show that, due to the agent’s endogenous signal manipulation, the principal may be worse off as
transparency improves. This result has a policy implication regarding disclosure requirements for
startups: more stringent disclosure requirements may harm the investors.
Specifically, if the opportunity to terminate the relationship arrives at a rate less than a cutoff,
then in equilibrium, the agent never engages in performance boosting too aggressively because
termination is always unlikely. In this case, as the signal-to-noise ratio grows, the information flow
in the principal’s optimal stopping problem approaches immediate revelation of the agent’s type,
which benefits the principal.
On the other hand, if the termination opportunity arrives at a rate greater than the aforementioned
cutoff, then the agent has stronger incentives to engage in performance boosting. We find, perhaps
surprisingly, that the principal’s payoff is nonmonotone in the signal-to-noise ratio of the perfor-
mance report, implying that the principal can be worse off when the performance measure becomes
more transparent (less noisy). We obtain this result by looking at two extreme cases. At one extreme,
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if the performance report is independent of the agent’s type and action (i.e., uninformative signals),
then the principal can never learn about the agent’s type and will receive her “no-information” value.
At the other extreme, as the signal-to-noise ratio grows without bound, we show that the principal
cannot utilize any information about the agent’s type either. Intuitively, in this case the agent will
engage in performance boosting aggressively (with a high intensity), for otherwise his type would
be revealed rapidly. Such aggressive performance boosting is anticipated by the principal, and thus
largely reduces the informativeness of the signal. As a result, the principal’s equilibrium payoff
converges to her “no-information” value. In contrast to the extreme cases, for intermediate values
of the signal-to-noise ratio, the principal will learn some information about the agent’s type and
get a payoff strictly above her “no-information” value.
Finally, we investigate the equilibrium outcomes as players get arbitrarily patient. We find a strong
manifestation of the ratchet effect in the patient limit of our model. Since the principal cannot commit
to not using future information against the agent, a patient agent will engage in performance boosting
with almost full intensity in order to maintain his reputation. At the limit, no useful information
is ever revealed, and the principal’s lack of commitment hurts her in the most extreme way.2
Related Literature. Our paper is most closely related to the reputation literature and the literature
on dynamic games with stopping decisions.
Most of the reputation literature — starting with Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1982), and later generalized by Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) and most recently
by Pei (forthcoming) — investigates whether and how much a long-lived informed party can benefit
from its private information in repeated games played against myopic opponents. The focus is
typically on the case where the informed party is arbitrarily patient, and on bounding the informed
player’s equilibrium payoffs.3 In contrast, our analysis fully characterizes equilibrium behavior for
all discount rates, and we uncover new qualitative features that the equilibrium dynamics exhibit.4
Faingold and Sannikov (2011) study reputation effects in games played in continuous time
with one long-lived informed player against myopic opponents, and they characterize the set of
sequential equilibria. Unlike Faingold and Sannikov (2011), the uninformed player in our game is
forward-looking and can terminate the game at any moment. More importantly, the termination
2 This result holds if both players get arbitrarily patient at the same rate, or if the agent gets patient at a faster rate
than does the principal.
3 There are also papers that bound equilibrium payoff of the informed player with long-lived uninformed players,
e.g., Schmidt (1993); Cripps and Thomas (1997); Celentani et al. (1996); Atakan and Ekmekci (2012, 2015).
4 Studies on reputation dynamics include Mailath and Samuelson (2001); Phelan (2006); Liu (2011); Ekmekci
(2011); Lee and Liu (2013); Liu and Skrzypacz (2014). However, these papers do not share similar equilibrium
dynamics or qualitative results that we obtain partly because they look at repeated moral hazard games and/or the
uninformed parties are myopic.
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payoffs depend on the informed player’s type, creating interdependence of payoffs between the
players (similar to Pei, forthcoming). Hence, their characterization is not applicable to our model,
and we obtain three qualitative results that do not have a counterpart in their paper.
There is a growing interest in dynamic games with stopping decisions. Daley and Green (2012),
Kolb (2015, 2019), Ekmekci and Maestri (2019) and Sun (2020) all study stopping games with
two long-lived players, where the uninformed party learns from endogenous sources and obtains
type-dependent payoffs. In Daley and Green (2012) and Kolb (2015), the informed player makes
the stopping decision while in our paper such decision is made by the uninformed player. This
makes our equilibrium structure very different from theirs. In Kolb (2019), the agent can only
influence the information process by irreversibly changing his type, while in our model the agent
can directly manipulate the signal, with his type being persistent. Besides, the qualitative results
on the equilibrium dynamics in our paper do not have a counterpart in these papers. Ekmekci and
Maestri (2019) study a similar setting in discrete time, and focus solely on the limiting case with
arbitrarily patient players. Our Theorem 4 is the continuous-time version of their main finding,
while we obtain much richer equilibrium dynamics for any fixed discount rate. Finally, Sun (2020)
studies dynamic censorship with Poisson news, wherein the agent can decide whether to show or
hide the news after privately observing its realization.5
Aghion and Jackson (2016) and Kuvalekar and Lipnowski (2020) also study dynamic games (in
discrete and continuous time, respectively) between two long-run players with stopping decisions.
However, the nature of uncertainty and agent’s actions in their models are quite different from ours.
Specifically, both of their papers look at a career-concern type of model with symmetric information
between the two players, while the agent’s actions affecting the signal process are costless to the
agent and observable to the principal. By contrast, in our model the agent has private information
about his type, and his action is costly and hidden. This necessarily makes the principal’s inference
problem more delicate, as she has to form a conjecture about the agent’s action which need coincide
with the agent’s actual strategy in equilibrium. Moreover, in our model the agent’s trade-off is
between improving his reputation and saving the mimicking cost, while in their models the agent is
optimizing over the speed of learning (i.e., variance, rather than drift, of the belief process). Orlov et
al. (2020) also consider a dynamic setting with stopping decisions and symmetrically informed
players, and they study the agent’s optimal information disclosure policy in a persuasion game.
Lastly, the continuous-time methods have been well-known for bringing tractability to analyses of
5 In Sun (2020), the equilibrium censoring intensity is monotone in the agent’s reputation while in our model,
the intensity of performance boosting is non-monotone. Besides, his analysis focuses on the welfare implications of the
censoring activity, while we examine the welfare effects of better transparency and the ratchet effect at the patient limit.
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dynamic incentives. Besides the aforementioned papers, recent works that exploit such tractability
include Demarzo et al. (2012), Bonatti et al. (2016), Ortner (2017), Cisternas (2017) and Varas et al.
(forthcoming), among others. In our paper, the continuous-time framework enables us to carry out
a tractable analysis of dynamic learning with asymmetric information and arbitrary discount factors.
2 Model
2.1 Players, types, actions, and information flow
A principal (she) and an agent (he), both risk-neutral, interact in continuous time t∈ [0,∞).
At any time t, the principal chooses whether to continue or stop the game. An exogenous stopping
opportunity arrives according to a Poisson process {Jt}t≥0 with rate λ>0, capturing the friction
in the principal’s decision making and implementation.6 The game irreversibly ends if and only
if the principal chooses to stop the game when the stopping opportunity arrives.
The agent can be one of two types, denoted by θ: an investible type (θ=I), or a noninvestible
type (θ=NI). The agent’s type is his private information. From the principal’s viewpoint, the
initial probability that the agent is a noninvestible type is p0∈(0,1).
There is a public signal {Xt}t≥0 that evolves over time. If the agent is an investible type, then
the public signal evolves according to the process:
dXt=µdt+dBt,
where {Bt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion. Without loss, we assume that µ>0, and normalize
the diffusion coefficient to 1. If the agent is a noninvestible type, he chooses an actionAt∈{0,1}
at any time t when the game has not stopped yet. In this case, the action choice controls the drift
of the public signal process:
dXt=µAtdt+dBt.
The action At=1 by the noninvestible type corresponds to the efforts taken in order to generate
a public signal with an identical distribution to that generated by the investible type.
The model assumes that the investible type does not have any action choice, and the evolution of
the public signal is exogenous conditional on this type. Meanwhile, the noninvestible type chooses
either to mimic the investible type (At = 1) or not (At = 0). In our leading application of VC
investments, we can interpret the public signal as performance reports from the startup and the
mimicking action taken by the noninvestible type as performance boosting.
6 Technically, this assumption will later ensure that there is no off-equilibrium history/belief.
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2.2 Strategies
The investible type of the agent does not have an action choice. A strategy for the noninvestible type
of the agent is a stochastic process {αt}t≥0 that takes value in [0,1], representing the probability
with which action 1 is played. We interpret αt as the mimicking intensity of the noninvestible type
at time t. LetA be the set of admissible strategies for the agent, which is the set of all progressively
measurable functions with respect to the filtration generated by {Bt}t≥0 that take value in [0,1].
A strategy for the principal is a stochastic process β≡{βt}t≥0, progressively measurable with
respect to the filtration generated by {Xt}t≥0, that represents the probability with which the principal
takes the stopping action. LetB be the set of admissible strategies for the principal.7
Every strategy profile, (α,β), together with the prior belief p0, induces a probability measure
P(α,β) over the outcomes. To keep the notation simple, we will drop the dependence of P on (α,β)
whenever it does not cause confusion. The principal updates her belief about the agent’s type using
Bayes’ rule, and we let {pt}t≥0 denote the belief process defined by
pt :=P{θ=NI | {Xs}s≤t}. (1)
Note that the belief process pt, conditional on a continuing relationship, is determined by the strategy
of the agent and not affected by that of the principal.
2.3 Payoffs
If the game is stopped, the agent receives his outside option v0, which we normalize to 0. If the
game is not yet stopped, the noninvestible agent receives a flow payoff that depends on his action,
u+1{At=0}c, where u> 0 and c > 0.8 That is, if the noninvestible agent does (not) mimic the
investible type then his flow payoff in the relationship is u (resp., u+c); thus, c is the flow cost of
mimicking. For a given strategy profile, (α,β), the expected discounted payoff of the noninvestible
agent at time t is given by
U1(t,α,β):=E
{∫ T
t
e−r1(τ−t)r1[(1−ατ)c+u]dτ
∣∣∣∣ θ=NI,{Bs}s≤t},
7 We note that the principal only observes the public signal, while the agent knows his own past actions, and thus
can recover {Bt}t≥0 by removing the drift term. Also, the principal privately observes the realization of {Jt}t≥0,
but allowing the principal’s strategy to depend on this information does not change any of our results.
8 The flow payoff of the investible type in the relationship is always some positive constant, say, u+c.
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where T is the random time at which the game stops and the expectation is taken over T . This
expression can be simplified to
U1(t,α,β):=E
{∫ ∞
t
e−Λ1(t,τ,β)r1[(1−ατ)c+u]dτ
∣∣∣∣ θ=NI,{Bs}s≤t},
where we define the discounting exponent
Λ1(t,τ,β):=
∫ τ
t
(r1+λβs)ds.
The principal’s flow payoff does not depend on the agent’s action or the public signal,9 and we
normalize her flow payoff to zero. However, the principal receives a lump-sum payoff of wNI>0 if
the game stops against a noninvestible type, and wI<0 if the game stops against an investible type.
That is, relative to continuing the relationship, the principal prefers stopping against a noninvestible
type but dislikes terminating an investible type. Thus, given a strategy profile (α,β), the expected
discounted payoff of the principal at time t is given by
U2(t,α,β):=E
{∫ ∞
t
e−Λ2(t,τ,β)λβτ
(
1{θ=NI}wNI+1{θ=I}wI
)
dτ
∣∣∣∣ {Xs}s≤t},
where we define the discounting exponent
Λ2(t,τ,β):=
∫ τ
t
(r2+λβs)ds.
Note that U2(t,α,β) is calculated conditional on the stopping opportunity not arriving (or having
been forgone) at time t.
3 Discussion of Model Assumptions
Although our model is stylized, the essential ingredients to it are the following:
1. The agent has private information about his type, and wants to stay in the relationship for
as long as possible.
2. The principal faces a learning problem about the agent’s type; she prefers to terminate against
9 This is a reasonable assumption in our leading examples of venture capital investments, wherein an investor’s
payoff is driven by the viability (type) of the startup rather than its performance in the initial financing period, though
the initial performance is informative to the investor about the startup’s type.
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the nonivestible type and to continue with the investible type.
3. The noninvestible type can costly manipulate the drift of a noisy signal to mimic the investible
type’s performance.
4. The signal only serves an informational role and is payoff-irrelevant to the principal.
In addition to these assumptions, we adopt a normalization of the players’ flow payoffs and outside
options for easiest exposition. Below, we present an alternative but equivalent formulation which
fits better with our leading VC examples.
Suppose that the principal’s outside option is independent of the agent’s type and is equal to 0.
By continuing the relationship the principal incurs a flow cost equal to b>0. There is a revealing
event that arrives according to a Poisson process with rate ρ, independent of the agent’s type. When
the event arrives, the game ends delivering a lump-sum payoff to the principal. This payoff is equal
to piI>0 if the agent is investible and piNI =0 otherwise. The flow cost represents the continuous
financial inputs that the VC contributes to the startup. The revealing event corresponds to the VC’s
realization of the startup’s profitability (type), and the ensuing type-dependent lump-sum payoffs
correspond to the value of the startup to the VC upon learning its type. As in the original formulation,
the principal can also terminate the relationship whenever a stopping opportunity arrives. The arrival
follows a Poisson process at rate λˆ, and is independent of the revealing event.
The (noninvestible) agent’s flow payoff is uˆ if he engages in performance boosting and uˆ+cˆ
otherwise. The agent receives a payoff of 0 when the relationship ends, either because the principal
terminates it or the revealing event occurs.10 The agent’s discount factor is rˆ1 and the principal’s
discount rate is rˆ2.
This formulation is strategically equivalent to the benchmark model with a type-dependent outside
option for the principal. The equivalence is achieved through the following transformation of
parameters, which can be verified by standard calculations. The agent’s flow payoffs are identical
across the two formulations, i.e., u= uˆ, c= cˆ, and so is the arrival rate of the principal’s stopping
opportunity, λ= λˆ. The implied discount rates are augmented by the arrival rate of the revealing event,
i.e., r1 = rˆ1+ρ, r2 = rˆ2+ρ. And finally, the principal’s type-dependent outside options are given by
wI=
rˆ2b−ρpiI
rˆ2+ρ
, wNI=
rˆ2b
rˆ2+ρ
.
10 We could also assume that the investible type gets a positive lump-sum reward when the revealing event occurs,
but this will not change the game in any way because the revealing event is out of everyone’s control.
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As long as piI> rˆ2ρ b (i.e., if the reward to the principal upon learning that the agent is investible
is large enough), we have wI<0<wNI, as in our benchmark model.
Finally, we remark that all of our analyses will still go through if there is a continuum of actions
for the noninvestible type with linear costs.
Going back to the VC examples (i.e., Luckin Coffee, ride-sharing platforms, and Theranos), we
now explain how they fit into the alternative model. As mentioned in the Introduction, startups often
have better information about the prospects of their projects than the VCs (Ross, 1977; Brealey et
al., 1977; Miller and Rock, 1985), and they are more eager to receive funding than the VCs would
like to invest. The public signal/performance reports correspond to user growth, sales statistics or
scientific progress reports. The manipulative action can represent, for example, i) inflated reporting
of sales numbers (Luckin),11 ii) personalized discounts for users (Uber, Lyft, or other platforms
where network effects are strong), iii) endorsements from scientists (Thenanos).12 Clearly these
manipulative actions are costly, and are hard to detect. Such performance reports are also noisy
due to demand shocks, measurements errors or other random events. Finally, our assumption that
performance reports do not affect the principal’s payoff is reasonable in these contexts, wherein
an investor’s payoff is mostly driven by the viability (type) of the startup rather than its performance
in the initial financing period, though the initial performance is informative about the startup’s type.
4 Equilibrium Characterization
4.1 Equilibrium Concept
An equilibrium is a strategy profile (α,β) such that
U1(t,α,β) ≥ U1(t,α˜,β),
U2(t,α,β) ≥ U2(t,α,β˜),
for all alternative strategies α˜∈A and β˜∈B, almost surely for all t≥0.13
11 A recent investigation has resulted in the company’s admission of exaggerating its sales volume and price per
sale. See https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-investors-can-learn-from-luckins-caffeine-crash-11585910558.
12 During a lawsuit against Theranos and throughout its massive expansion, the chief scientist, Ian Gibbons,
was pressured to back the company even though he had problems putting the claimed technology to work. See
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3776888/Award-winning-scientist-struggling-make-Theranos-blood-test-
machines-work-committed-suicide-amid-fears-Silicon-Valley-firm-s-32-year-old-CEO-fire-claims-wife.html.
13 Note that for any t>0, Ui(t,α,β) is player i’s expected payoff conditional on the respective filtration at time
t. Thus, Ui(t,α,β) itself is a random variable and the inequality about Ui in this definition is interpreted to hold almost
surely (i.e., for almost all histories up to t).
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Let
P∗ :={f :(0,1)→ [0,1],f is measurable},
and14
P :={f :(0,1)→ [0,1],f is right-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz}.
Recall that the belief process defined in (1) is determined by the agent’s strategy. We say that an
agent’s strategyα is Markovian if there exists policy function a∈P such thatαt=a(pt) for all t≥0.
An equilibrium (α,β) isMarkovian if there exist policy functions a,b∈P such that αt=a(pt) and
βt=b(pt) for all t≥0. In this case, we say that the policy profile (a,b)∈P2 is induced by (α,β).
Given a Markovian equilibrium (α,β), let SP(α) be the set of posteriors reached on the equi-
librium path.15
Lemma 1. Any Markovian equilibrium (α,β) with an induced policy profile (a,b) satisfies i)
supp∈(0,1)a(p)<1, and ii) SP(α)=(0,1).
Given a Markovian equilibrium (α,β), the continuation payoff at time t depends only on the
public belief pt. Hence, we define the value function of the (noninvestible) agent as
V (p):=E{U1(t,α,β) | pt=p,θ=NI}
and the value function of the principal as
W(p):=E{U2(t,α,β) | pt=p}
for every p∈(0,1).
We say that a value function is regular if it is continuously differentiable everywhere, and twice
continuously differentiable everywhere except perhaps at a finite number of points. We say that a
Markovian equilibrium (α,β) is smooth if the associated value functions are regular and the agent’s
policy function a is Lipschitz. We refer to all smooth Markovian equilibria simply as Markov
equilibria. Moreover, when there is no confusion, we denote a Markov equilibrium by the policy
profile (a,b) that it induces.
14 A function f :(0,1)→ [0,1] is piecewise Lipschitz if there exist n∈N and 0=x1<x2<...<xn=1, such that
for each i∈{1,...,n−1}, there exists a Lipschitz function fi on [xi,xi+1] such that fi(p)=f(p) for all p∈(xi,xi+1).
15 Consider a Markovian equilibrium, (α,β), and the underlying probability space (Ω,F,P). For each p∈(0,1), we
define Φ(p):={ω∈Ω:∃t≤T such that pt(ω)=p}. The belief span, SP(α), is the set of all p such that P(Φ(p))>0.
Because pt in a continuing relationship depends only on the agent’s strategy α and the principal’s stopping opportunity
which follows a Poisson process may not arrive at any t, the belief span is also solely determined by α. Consequently,
this notion of belief span can be defined for any (Markovian) strategy of the agent.
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4.2 Characterization
We first introduce some terminology to define properties of policy functions for the principal and
the agent.
Definition 1. The policy function b∈P for the principal has a cutoff structure if there exists
a p˜∈ [0,1] such that b(p)=0 for p<p˜, and b(p)=1 for p>p˜. We refer to p˜ as the cutoff belief of b.
Definition 2. The policy function a ∈P for the (noninvestible) agent is fully separating if
a(p)=0 for all p∈(0,1).
Definition 3. The policy function a∈P for the (noninvestible) agent is hump-shaped if a is
continuous and there are cutoffs 0< pL < p∗ < pR < 1 such that a(p) = 0 for p≤ pL, strictly
increasing on (pL,p∗), strictly decreasing on (p∗,pR), and a(p)=0 for p≥pR.
Theorem 1. There always exists a unique Markov equilibrium (a,b). In this equilibrium, b has
a cutoff structure with some cutoff belief p∗∈(0,1). Moreover, there exists r∗>0 such that
1. If r1≥r∗, then a is fully separating.
2. If r1<r∗, then a is hump-shaped and is maximized at p∗.
Theorem 1 characterizes the structure of the unique Markov equilibrium. First, the principal uses
a cutoff strategy. This follows from the type-dependent stopping payoff of the principal, and the
absence of flow payoffs.
Second, the noninvestible agent’s behavior depends on his discount rate. If he is impatient
(i.e., with a high discount rate), then he never mimics the investible type, because he always finds
the saving of the mimicking cost to outweigh the benefit of having a better reputation. A richer
dynamics opens up if the agent is patient (i.e., with a low discount rate). In this case, his behavior
can be described by three reputation phases: high, medium and low, as depicted in Figure 1. Both
in the high and the low reputation phases, the noninvestible type does not mimic the investible
type at all, but for different reasons: when his reputation is high, the relationship is highly stable,
so the noninvestible agent gains little from further improving his reputation by mimicking; when
his reputation is low, termination is so imminent that the noninvestible agent gives up building
reputation. In the intermediate phase, however, the noninvestible type first starts to mimic more
often as his reputation worsens in order to slow down the principal’s learning, and then he gradually
gives up as the relationship becomes doomed. His mimicking intensity is highest at belief p∗ when
the principal’s action switches from continuing the relationship to termination.
12
a(p
)
Figure 1: Agent’s Equilibrium Policy Function When r1 <r∗. This figure is plotted under the
following parameter values: r1 = 0.5, r2 = 0.5, λ= 2, µ= 1.5, u= 1, c= 1, wNI = 1, wI =−1.
In equilibrium, pL≈0.195, p∗≈0.565, pR≈0.633.
Finally, the cutoff discount rate, r∗, can be characterized in closed form. Specifically, r∗ is the
unique solution to the following equation:
r∗(
√
1+8r∗/µ2+
√
1+8(r∗+λ)/µ2)+λ(
√
1+8r∗/µ2+1)=4λ
(u
c
+1
)
. (2)
Several comparative statics results are straightforward to obtain. In particular, r∗ increases with
λ, µ and u
c
. This is intuitive, because the noninvestible type will have a higher incentive to mimic
if: i) the stopping opportunity arrives more frequently and thus the relationship becomes less stable;
ii) the signal-to-noise ratio is higher and thus a manipulation of signal becomes more profitable; iii)
mimicking becomes relatively less costly. We also note that r∗ does not depend on the principal’s
payoff parameters (r2, wNI and wI).
Below we describe our approach to proving Theorem 1. Finding a Markov equilibrium amounts
to finding a policy profile (a,b), and a conjecture that the principal holds about the agent’s strategy
such that: i) the principal’s conjecture determines her interpretation of public signal histories into
her beliefs about the agent’s type; ii) the principal’s policy b is optimal given her conjecture about
the agent’s strategy; iii) the agent’s policy a is optimal given b and the principal’s conjecture; iv)
the principal’s conjecture coincides with a.
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Specifically, any Markov equilibrium (a,b) satisfies the optimality conditions stated below.16
Principal’s Optimality:
b∈argmax
b˜∈P∗
Wˆ(p,a,˜b), (3)
where
Wˆ(p,a,˜b):=E{e−r2ν(1{θ=NI}wNI+1{θ=I}wI)},
where p0 =p, ν is the time when the game stops, controlled by both b˜ and {Jt}t≥0, and the evolution
of {pt}t≥0 is given by the SDE (for a formal derivation, see, e.g., Bolton and Harris, 1999)
dpt=−µ(1−at)γ(pt)dB˜t. (4)
In (4), at is a function of pt, γ : [0,1]→R+ is defined by γ(p) := p(1−p), and (B˜t)t≥0 is the
innovation process associated with the filtering of the principal, i.e.,
dB˜t=dXt−µ(ptat+1−pt)dt. (5)
The optimality condition (3) requires that b maximizes the principal’s payoff when the agent
is using policy a.
Agent’s Optimality:
a∈argmax
a˜∈P∗
Vˆ (p,a˜,b;a), (6)
and
Vˆ (p,a˜,b;a):=E
{∫ ν
0
e−r1τ{r1[(1−a˜(pτ))c+u]}dτ
}
where p0 =p, ν is the time when the game stops, and the evolution of {pt}t≥0 is given by substituting
dXt=µa˜tdt+dBt into equations (4) and (5). Specifically, from the noninvestible type’s perspective,
the belief process satisfies:
dpt=µ
2(1−at)[1−a˜t−pt(1−at)]γ(pt)dt−µ(1−at)γ(pt)dBt. (7)
In a Markov equilibrium (a,b), the principal has a conjecture about the agent’s behavior, which
16 The optimality conditions (3) and (6) restrict the players to maximize their payoffs over only Markov controls.
This is for expository purposes and is without loss. We will verify in the proof of Theorem 1 that the equilibrium
strategies are mutual best replies among all admissible strategies inB andA .
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determines how she interprets any history of signal realizations into her belief about the agent’s type.
This conjecture has to coincide with the agent’s policy a in equilibrium. If the agent contemplates a
deviation from the equilibrium, this would not affect the processes in equations (4) and (5) (which
jointly describe the dependence of beliefs on the public history), but would affect the process that
governs the evolution ofXt (public histories). The necessary condition (6) requires that the agent
does not have a profitable deviation from his equilibrium policy function a, when the principal
conjectures that the agent is using this policy function.
We now proceed by utilizing the implications of the necessary conditions outlined above. We first
show that in any Markov equilibrium, the principal’s policy function has a cutoff structure: she termi-
nates the relationship if and only if the agent’s reputation is bad enough. We then show that the agent’s
equilibrium policy function must be either fully separating (i.e., never mimicking) or hump-shaped.
Finally, the existence and uniqueness of Markov equilibrium follows from a fixed-point argument.
Let R(p):=pwNI+(1−p)wI be the principal’s expected payoff if the relationship is terminated
at belief p. Define p∗∗ :=R−1(0)>0 and pH :=R−1
(
λ
r2+λ
wNI
)
<1.
Lemma 2. If (a,b) is a Markov equilibrium, then b has a cutoff structure with a cutoff belief
p∗∈ [p∗∗,pH].
To prove this result, we utilize the optimality condition in (3). Observe that the equilibrium value
function,W(p), is such thatW(p):=Wˆ(p,a,b). Then, the principal’s value and policy functions
must satisfy the following HJB equation:
r2W(p)= max
b˜∈[0,1]
{
1
2
µ2[1−a(p)]2γ(p)2W ′′(p)+λb˜[R(p)−W(p)]
}
. (8)
It is clear that b(p)=0 whenever R(p)<W(p), and b(p)=1 whenever R(p)>W(p). In the proof,
we show that these functions have a unique intersection point. Moreover, because terminating the
relationship when p<p∗∗ gives the principal a negative payoff, and because the stopping opportunity
arrives only once in a while which bounds her payoff from waiting by λ
r2+λ
wNI, the principal’s
optimal stopping threshold must be between p∗∗ and pH. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
We now turn to the agent’s behavior.
Lemma 3. Suppose b∈P is a cutoff policy function for the principal with cutoff belief p∗. Then,
there is a unique policy function a∈P for the agent such that i) Vˆ (p,a(p),b(p);a(p)) is a regular
function of p, ii) a is Lipschitz and supp∈(0,1)a(p)<1, and iii) a satisfies (6). Moreover, this unique
policy function is fully separating if r1≥r∗, and is hump-shaped if r1<r∗.
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Figure 2: Principal’s Equilibrium Cutoff. This figure is plotted under the following parameter
values: r1 =0.5, r2 =0.5, λ=2, µ=1.5, u=1, c=1, wNI=1, wI=−1. In equilibrium, p∗∗=0.5,
p∗≈0.565, pH=0.9.
The proof of Lemma 3 is more involved. This is because finding a solution to program (6) is akin
to finding a fixed point: the policy a for the agent is optimal when the principal holds the conjecture
a. Nonetheless, we are able to characterize its unique solution in closed form.
Intuitively, if the agent is impatient, the short-run incentives determine his behavior, and the
noninvestible type will never pay the cost to mimic the investible type, leading to a fully separating
policy function. If the agent is patient, full separation can no longer be part of an equilibrium. This is
because the fully separating policy function, if conjectured by the principal, generates opportunities
to build a reputation rather fast; and when the agent cares enough about the future, it will give strict
incentives to the noninvestible type to mimic.
What is the dynamics of the agent’s mimicking intensity when he is patient? When the public
belief p is very small, it takes a long time for the belief to increase all the way up to the termination
cutoff. Hence, the limited benefit of further improving reputation cannot justify the mimicking cost.
As a result, a(p)=0 for low p. When p is very large, it takes so long for the agent to regain his
reputation that he simply gives up. Consequently, a(p)=0 for high p. For intermediate p, the agent’s
short-run temptation and long-run benefits are more balanced, so that a(p)∈(0,1). Specifically,
after the high reputation phase, for p∈(pL,p∗), the noninvestible type starts to mimic more often as
16
his reputation worsens. Such an incentive peaks at p∗ where the principal’s action is most sensitive
to a change in belief. After that, for p∈(p∗,pR), the noninvestible type gradually gives up restoring
his reputation as termination becomes more imminent.
5 Non-Monotonicity of Expected Performance
We saw in Theorem 1 that the noninvestible type will engage in performance boosting whenever
he is sufficiently patient, in which case a peaks at the termination cutoff p∗. We interpret this as a
“scramble-to-rescue” effect: the agent increases his mimicking intensity (before p∗) as the relationship
gets less stable.
What is its implication on the observables? An outsider (the principal or a modeler) does not see
the agent’s type or action, but can observe his performance, such as subscription growth or progress
reports. In our model, the expected performance at time t is given by
EPt :=
E[dXt]
dt
=µ
1−pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
investible
+ pta(pt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
noninvestible
.
Holding constant a<1, the expected performance decreases with p. We call this the belief effect: if
the agent is more likely to be noninvestible, then the expected performance is lower. This is the entire
story if the equilibrium is fully separating, in which case a(p)=0 everywhere andEP(p)=µ(1−p).
However, if the equilibrium is not fully separating, the noninvestible type’s mimicking intensity a
is no longer constant: it is increasing below p∗ due to the scramble-to-rescue effect. Hence, whether
the expected performance increases or decreases with the public belief depends on which of the two
effects is stronger. The following theorem characterizes the evolution of the expected performance
when the stopping opportunity arrives sufficiently fast.
Theorem 2. Fixing all parameters of the model other than r1 and λ, there exists λ¯ such that for
all λ>λ¯, EP(p) is non-monotone whenever the equilibrium is not fully separating (i.e., whenever
r1<r
∗). In particular, EP(p) is
• strictly decreasing for p∈ [0,p), where p is in [pL,p∗);
• strictly increasing for p∈(p,p∗);
• strictly decreasing for p∈(p∗,1].
Theorem 2 shows that if the arrival rate of the stopping opportunity is large enough, the scramble-
to-rescue effect will dominate the belief effect when the public belief is less than but close to
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the termination cutoff p∗. As a result, the expected performance reaches a local maximum at p∗
whenever the agent’s equilibrium policy function is hump-shaped (see Figure 3).17
EP
(p
)
Figure 3: Agent’s Expected Performance When λ>λ¯ and r1<r∗. This figure is plotted under
the following parameter values: r1 =0.5, r2 =0.5, λ=2, µ=1.5, u=1, c=1, wNI=1, wI=−1.
In the context of our applications, Theorem 2 offers an empirical prediction of our model: when
performance boosting is expected to happen, terminations are preceded by a spike in expected
performance. This seems consistent with a number of famous cases of corporate failure, such as
Theranos, Luckin Coffee and WeWork: there were periods of time during which market suspicions
about their business models grew, meanwhile the companies kept performing strongly and/or
expanding aggressively prior to the crashes of their market values.18
17 The lower bound on λ is not crucial for the qualitative predication. In fact, even if λ is small, we can show that
the expected performance is either decreasing or has the shape described in Theorem 2 (see Lemma 4). Moreover,
for any λ, we can find a r¯ (less than r∗) such that the expected performance is non-monotone whenever r1<r¯. The
only difference for small λ is that we cannot say definitively what will happen when r1∈(r¯,r∗).
18 For example, during the third quarter of 2019, Luckin Coffee reported a 470.1% increase in the total items sold
from 7.8 million in the same quarter of 2018. Its stock price was slashed by 75% in April 2020, following suspicion and
then admission of fabricating sales data. Likewise, before scandals started to unravel, Theranos falsely claimed in 2014
that the company had annual revenues of $100 million, a thousand times more than the actual figure of $100,000. In
the case of WeWork, the company once had expanded to over 86 cities in 32 countries, despite growing suspicion about
its profitability. However, in September 2019, the companied delayed its IPO, followed by a 90% slash in valuation
and enormous layoffs.
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6 Better Transparency May Hurt the Principal
The noise in the performance measure may come from various random events such as temporary
demand shocks, measurement errors, etc., makingXt only an imperfect signal of the agent’s type.
The transparency of the performance measure can be captured by its signal-to-noise ratio. In reality,
transparency can be improved (reduced) by having more (less) stringent disclosure requirements.
In this section, we investigate whether policies that improve transparency will help the principal. We
find that, under some parameters, improving transparency can inhibit learning and hurt the principal,
due to the agent’s endogenous response through signal manipulation.
Recall that the drift of the signal process is µ and that its diffusion coefficient is normalized to
1. Therefore, the signal-to-noise ratio in our model is simply µ. In what follows, we will fix all
parameters other than µ, and analyze the principal’s payoff as µ increases. Hence, we make explicit
the dependence of any variable or function on µ.
As a benchmark, suppose that the principal never receives any information about the agent’s type.
Recall thatR(p)=pwNI+(1−p)wI and p∗∗=R−1(0). In this case, the principal would continue
the relationship if p<p∗∗, and she would terminate the relationship at the first stopping opportunity
if p>p∗∗. This leads to the following “no-information value function” for the principal:
W(p):=
λ
r2+λ
max{0,pwNI+(1−p)wI}= λ
r2+λ
max{0,R(p)}.
Note that when µ is near 0, the signal process is close to pure noise regardless of the agent’s action.
So we have the following observation.
Observation 1. limµ→0W(p0;µ)=W(p0) and limµ→0p∗(µ)=p∗∗.
Similarly, suppose that the agent’s type is exogenously and immediately revealed to the principal.
In this case, the principal will obtain her highest possible payoff for each belief, summarized by
her “full-information value function”:
W¯(p):=
λ
r2+λ
[pmax{0,wNI}+(1−p)max{0,wI}]= λ
r2+λ
pwNI.
Note that the principal’s equilibrium payoff is always strictly betweenW(p0) and W¯(p0). This is
because some learning will take place in equilibrium (as the noninvestible type never fully mimics),
but the agent’s type is not immediately revealed (as µ<∞).
Observation 2. For all µ∈(0,∞) and p0∈(0,1),W(p0;µ)∈(W(p0),W¯(p0)).
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The next theorem characterizes the limiting behavior of the principal’s payoff as µ goes to infinity.
Theorem 3. Letting λ˜ :=r1
(
c
u
)
,
1. If λ<λ˜, then limµ→∞||W(·;µ)−W¯(·)||∞=0 and limµ→∞p∗(µ)=1.
2. If λ>λ˜, then limµ→∞||W(·;µ)−W(·)||∞=0 and limµ→∞p∗(µ)=p∗∗.
When the stopping opportunity arrives slowly (λ< λ˜), the noninvestible type’s incentives to
mimic are not strong. Intuitively, the relationship is relatively stable from the agent’s viewpoint
because, due to the lack of stopping opportunity, it will take a long time for the relationship to
end even if the principal has decided to terminate it. As a result, the agent’s equilibrium action
is bounded away from “full mimicking” for all µ.19 As µ grows without bound, the public signal
becomes increasingly informative about the agent’s type, and in the end, the agent’s type is almost
immediately revealed. Thus, the principal can afford to wait until being very certain that the agent
is noninvestible, and her equilibrium value function converges to W¯ (see Figure 4, left panel).
On the other hand, when the stopping opportunity arrives fast (λ>λ˜), the noninvestible type
has stronger incentives to mimic the investible type. In particular, as µ increases without bound,
the equilibrium mimicking intensity at the termination cutoff converges to 1. The speed of this
convergence is so fast that the variance of the belief process vanishes there (i.e., p∗ becomes an
almost absorbing state). Meanwhile, the equilibrium policy function a(·) converges to 1 also
for p<p∗, and it converges to a function that is strictly less than 1 for p>p∗. In both of these
regions, the principal will learn some information about the agent’s type from the public signal.20
However, this information is not useful (payoff-relevant) for the principal since it does not lead
to an action change. Hence, the principal’s termination cutoff converges to p∗∗ and her equilibrium
value function converges toW—as if no information would ever arrive (see Figure 4, right panel).
The following corollary follows immediately from Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. For any λ>λ˜ and p0∈(0,1), there exist µ1,µ2 such that µ1>µ2 andW(p0;µ1)<
W(p0;µ2).
Corollary 1 illustrates that a more transparent performance measure (higher µ) can sometimes
reduce the principal’s payoff. Hence, this result has a policy implication: too stringent disclosure
19 For sufficiently small λ, the noninvestible type does not mimic at all (i.e., a(p)=0 for all p), and the principal’s
problem becomes identical to a standard two-armed bandit problem. For relatively large λ (still less than λ˜), some
mimicking appears in equilibrium, but a(·) is uniformly bounded away from 1 for all µ.
20 More precisely, the diffusion coefficient of the belief process at p is proportional to µ[1−a(p;µ)]. We can show
that limµ→∞µ[1−a(p∗(µ);µ)]=0, while limµ→∞µ[1−a(p;µ)]>0 for any fixed interior p 6=p∗∗.
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Figure 4: Convergence of the Principal’s Equilibrium Value Function. This figure is plotted
under the following parameter values: r1 =0.5, r2 =0.5, u=1, c=1, wNI =1, wI =−1 (so that
p∗∗=0.5, λ˜=0.25); λ=0.1 for (a), λ=2 for (b).
requirements may harm the investors. Intuitively, when the signal-to-noise ratio is very high, the
mimicking incentives of the noninvestible type can be so strong that the public signal provides little
useful information to the principal about the agent’s type. In that case, introducing more noise to
the public signal can lessen such perverse incentives of the noninvestible type, which leads to a
more informative equilibrium signal process, benefiting the principal.21
7 Information at the Patient Limit
We now investigate the equilibrium outcomes as players get arbitrarily patient. The purpose is to
see more clearly the role of patience in the principal’s incentives to wait for more information and
in the agent’s incentives to engage in performance boosting.
First, consider an extreme case where r1 is constant and r2 goes to 0 (i.e., the principal gets
arbitrarily more patient than the agent). In this case, the agent’s mimicking intensity (which is
independent of r2) stays bounded away from 1 everywhere, implying that the public signal always
reveals some information about the agent’s type. As the principal gets more patient, her marginal
cost of waiting for new information becomes lower. Consequently, a patient principal will terminate
the relationship only when p is very high. Indeed, the termination cutoff converges to 1 and the
21 The possibility that better monitoring/more transparency may hurt a principal or relationship can appear in other
settings, such as career-concern models (Holmstro¨m, 1999; Dewatripont et al., 1999), contracting in insurance markets
(Hirshleifer, 1971; Schlee, 2001), and contracting with moral hazard (Zhu, 2020). In our model, this effect shows
up for a different reason: better monitoring may give stronger incentives to the agent to engage in performance boosting,
which depresses the informativeness of the public signals.
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principal’s payoff converges to W¯ .
Next, consider the other extreme case where r2 is constant and r1 goes to 0 (i.e., the agent gets ar-
bitrarily more patient than the principal). As the agent gets more patient, he cares more about staying
in the relationship for long and less about the instantaneous mimicking cost. Thus, the noninvestible
type has stronger incentives to mimic the investible type, and the equilibirum mimicking intensity
approaches one at and below the termination cutoff. At the limit, the outcome is similar to the case
for large µ and λ characterized in the previous section. That is, it is as if no information ever arrives,
with the termination cutoff converging to p∗∗ and the principal’s value function converging toW .
What happens in between the two extreme cases? Take a sequence {r1,n,r2,n}n of discount rates
such that ri,n→0 for both i=1,2 and limn r2,nr1,n =χ∈(0,∞). Consider a sequence of games along
which all other parameters are fixed, and let {Wn,Vn}n be the corresponding sequence of value
functions for the principal and the agent, respectively.
Theorem 4. Wn(·) converges uniformly to max{0,R(·)}, and Vn(·) converges pointwise to V ∗(·)
which satisfies
V ∗(p):=
u, if p<p∗∗0, if p>p∗∗ .
Theorem 4 shows that if both players get arbitrarily patient at comparable rates, then it is as if the
principal does not receive any information. Along the sequence, both the agent’s incentives to mimic
and the principal’s resolve to wait for more information get stronger, but the former effect dominates.
We view this result as a strong manifestation of the ratchet effect in the patient limit of our model.
Since the principal cannot commit to not using future information against the agent, the noninvestible
type will engage in performance boosting with almost full intensity in order to maintain his reputation.
In the end, no useful information is ever revealed, and the principal’s lack of commitment hurts her
in the most extreme way. In our applications, this result suggests that the use of other instruments,
such as some form of commitment (e.g., setting a deadline and/or grace period), additional screening
devices (e.g., performance-based investment levels and/or salaries), or huge fines that increase the
expected cost of performance boosting, may be necessary to help the principal get more information.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study a stopping game with asymmetric information where the performance
measures that reflect the fundamental can be manipulated by an agent at a cost. Despite the model
being stylized, we obtain rich equilibrium dynamics. Our model illustrates that inflated performance
can coexist with growing suspicion about a project’s viability. Our analysis also implies that too much
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transparency may lead to adverse consequences on the principal’s ability to learn, by encouraging
excessive performance boosting. This result suggests that some noise in the monitoring technology
may be beneficial for the principal. Furthermore, we find that an extreme form of ratchet effect shows
up in the patient limit, preventing any useful learning from happening. This appears because of the
principal’s lack of commitment to refraining from using learned information against the agent, giving
a highly patient noninvestible type strong incentives to boost performance and maintain his reputation.
Several ways to extend our analysis are worth mentioning. While our main focus is the adverse
selection problem, in some settings moral hazard is a prominent issue. Thus, allowing the agent’s
action to directly influence the principal’s payoff would be an interesting direction. Relatedly,
allowing the agent’s flow payoff to be history-dependent would enable the principal to offer bonuses
based on past performance. Another direction is to expand the choice set of the principal by allowing
her to elevate the “status” of the relationship, such as promoting the agent or upgrading the terms
of financing. Finally, optimal contracting in this setting remains an open problem. We leave them
as interesting directions for future research.
A Appendix: Proofs
Remark. Because only the noninvestible type of the agent has an active choice to make, whenever there
is no confusion we simply refer to the “noninvestible-type agent” as the agent.
A.1 Equilibrium Characterization: Toward a Proof of Theorem 1
To establish Theorem 1, we use the results that the equilibrium belief process must have full support (Lemma
1), and that the principal’s equilibrium strategy must have a cutoff structure (Lemma 2). These two lemmas are
proved in the Online Appendix. The main proof characterizes the agent’s (pseudo-)best reply to any cutoff ter-
mination rule (Lemma 3). Finally, we prove equilibrium existence and uniqueness using a fixed point argument.
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3
In light of Lemma 2, let us fix a cutoff termination rule of the principal. We define a new state variable
Zt :=log
pt
1−pt , which is a strictly increasing transformation of pt. Note that Zt is defined on (−∞,∞).
Given the principal’s conjecture a(·) about the agent’s policy function and the agent’s actual policy function
a˜(·), the law of motion of pt is given by (7). By Itoˆ’s lemma, the law of motion of Zt is
dZt=µ
2(1−at)
[
1−a˜t− 12(1−at)
]
dt−µ(1−at)dBt. (9)
Now, suppose that the principal uses a particular cutoff policy function b with cutoff belief p∗∈ (0,1).
Suppose also that the noninvestible type’s policy function a satisfies the conditions in Lemma 3: a(·) is
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Lipschitz, supp∈(0,1)a(p)<1, and it satisfies (6), i.e., a∈argmaxa˜∈P∗Vˆ (p,a˜,b;a); moreover, the resulting
V (p) = Vˆ (p,a(p),b(p);a(p)) is regular. For brevity, we call any a(·) that satisfies these conditions a
pseudo-best reply to b(·).22 Lipschitz continuity of a(·) implies that, for any control in P∗ or A , the
controlled process pt or Zt in the agent’s problem always admits a unique strong solution.
Let Zt be the new state variable and define v(z):=V
(
ez
1+ez
)
and z∗ :=log p
∗
1−p∗ . Because we work with
Zt most of the time in this appendix, we will write a(z) to mean a
(
ez
1+ez
)
whenever there is no confusion.
The HJB for the agent is23
[r1+b(z)λ]v(z)= max
a˜∈[0,1]
r1[u+(1−a˜)c]+µ2[1−a(z)]
[
1−a˜− 12(1−a(z))
]
v′(z)+ 12µ
2[1−a(z)]2v′′(z).
(10)
The following sequence of claims establishes some necessary properties of any pseudo-best reply a(·).
Claim 1. a(z)=1− r1c
max{r1c,−µ2v′(z)} , for all z∈(−∞,∞).
Proof. Since the RHS of (10) is affine in the choice variable, optimality requires that, for almost every z∈R,24
a(z)

=0, if r1c+µ2[1−a(z)]v′>0
∈ [0,1] if r1c+µ2[1−a(z)]v′=0
=1, if r1c+µ2[1−a(z)]v′<0
.
This implies that, for almost every z∈R, we have
a(z)=1− r1c
max{r1c,−µ2v′(z)} . (11)
Since both sides of (11) are continuous in z (recall that a(·) is Lipschitz by assumption, and v(·) is C1 by
assumption), we conclude that (11) must hold for every z∈R.25
Claim 2. Fix any z1<z2≤z∗ and suppose that a(z)=0 for all z∈(z1,z2). Then,
v(z)=u+c+A1e
ξLz+A2e
ξ′Lz,∀z∈(z1,z2) (12)
for someA1,A2∈R, where ξL>0>ξ′L are the two roots of the characteristic equation ξ2+ξ=(2r1/µ).
22 We call such a(·) pseudo-best reply because b(·) by itself does not lead to a well-defined strategy of the principal;
the principal’s interpretation of the observed signal into her posterior belief depends on (her conjecture of) the agent’s
strategy. The equilibrium condition that the principal’s conjecture coincides with the agent’s actual strategy is imposed
as part of the definition of a pseudo-best reply.
23 Since v is regular, v is C2 except at possibly finite points. This HJB holds on any interval over which v is C2.
24 Since supz∈Ra(z)<1 by definition of a pseudo-best reply (and by Lemma 1), the law of motion (9) implies
that the distribution of Zt has full support for any t>0, i.e., supp(Zt)=R,∀t>0.
25 This is because any continuous function that is 0 almost everywhere is equal to 0 everywhere.
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Proof. Since b(z)=0 and a(z)=0 for all z∈(z1,z2), equation (10) becomes
r1v(z)=r1(u+c)+
1
2
µ2[v′(z)+v′′(z)].
It is easy to verify that its general solution is given by (12).
Claim 3. Fix any z∗≤z1<z2 and suppose that a(z)=0 for all z∈(z1,z2). Then,
v(z)=
r1
r1+λ
(u+c)+B1e
ξRz+B2e
ξ′Rz,∀z∈(z1,z2) (13)
for someB1,B2∈R, where ξR<0<ξ′R are the two roots of the characteristic equation ξ2+ξ=2(r1+λ)/µ.
Proof. Since b(z)=1 and a(z)=0 for all z∈(z1,z2), equation (10) becomes
(r1+λ)v(z)=r1(u+c)+
1
2
µ2[v′(z)+v′′(z)].
It is easy to verify that its general solution is given by (13).
Now, let us denote by Φ and φ the CDF and PDF of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
Claim 4. Fix any z1<z2≤z∗ and suppose that a(z)∈(0,1) for all z∈(z1,z2). Then,
v(z)=u+
√
κLΦ
−1(C1ez+C2),∀z∈(z1,z2) (14)
and
a(z)=1+
√
2r1
µ
φ
(
Φ−1(C1ez+C2)
)
C1ez
(15)
for some C1<0 and C2∈R, where κL := r1c22µ2 .
Moreover, a(z) is strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or first strictly decreasing and then strictly
increasing on (z1,z2).
Proof. Fix any z1<z2≤z∗ such that a(z)∈(0,1) for all z∈(z1,z2). Claim 1 implies that
a(z)=1+
r1c
µ2v′(z)
,∀z∈(z1,z2). (16)
Substituting (16) into (10) and setting b(z)=0, we have
v(z)=u+κL
v′′(z)−v′(z)
v′(z)2
. (17)
It is easy to verify that its general solution is given by (14), and that the resulting a(·) implied by (16) is
given by (15). Moreover, since a(z)∈(0,1), we must have v′(z)<0, i.e., C1<0.
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To analyze the monotonicity of a(·) on (z1,z2), we first establish the following equality which links a′(z)
to a(z):
1−a(z)−a′(z)=2
(
v(z)−u
c
)
. (18)
By (16),
1−a(z)=− r1c
µ2v′(z)
.
Differentiating this expression, we obtain
−a′(z)= r1c
µ2
v′′(z)
v′(z)2
=−v
′′(z)
v′(z)
[1−a(z)].
Recall, from the agent’s HJB (17) in this case, that
v′′(z)
v′(z)
=1+
[v(z)−u]v′(z)
κL
=1−2
(
v(z)−u
c
)
1
1−a(z) ,
where the second equality follows from (16) and κL= r1c
2
2µ2
. Equation (18) then follows immediately.
Equation (18) implies that
(i) If a′(z˜)<0 for some z˜∈(z1,z2), then a′(z)<0 for all z∈(z1,z˜).
(ii) There does not exist an interval I⊆(z1,z2) s.t. a′(z)=0 for all z∈I.
(iii) If a(z˜)≥0 for some z˜∈(z1,z2), then a(·) is strictly increasing on (z˜,z2).
To see (i), suppose that a′(z˜)<0 for some z˜∈ (z1,z2). Since a(·) given by (15) is a smooth function
on (z1,z2), we can define z=inf
{
z∈ [z1,z˜):a′(·)|(z,z˜]<0
}
. Result (i) is proved if z=z1. Suppose (for a
contradiction) that z>z1. Continuity of a′ implies that a′(z)=0. Moreover, since a′(z)<0 for all z∈(z,z˜],
we have a(z)>a(z˜). Then,
2
(
v(z)−u
c
)
=1−a(z)−a′(z)<1−a(z˜)−a′(z˜)=2
(
v(z˜)−u
c
)
where the equalities follow from (18) and the strict inequality follows from a(z)>a(z˜) and a′(z)=0>a′(z˜).
But this is a contradiction to v(z)>v(z˜) because C1<0 and v is strictly decreasing on (z1,z2).
To see (ii), suppose (for a contradiction) that there exists an interval I⊆(z1,z2) s.t. a′(z)=0 for all z∈I.
Then, the LHS of (18) is constant on I while the RHS is strictly decreasing, a contradiction.
To see (iii), suppose that a′(z˜)≥0 for some z˜∈(z1,z2). Then, we must have a′(z)≥0 for all z∈(z˜,z2),
for otherwise we would reach a contradiction to (i). Further, take any z3,z4 s.t. z˜≤ z3<z4≤ z2. Since
a′(z)≥0, we know that a(z3)≤a(z4). But this inequality must be strict, for otherwise a(z3)=a(z)=a(z4)
for all z∈(z3,z4) contradicting Result (ii). So, a(·) is strictly increasing on (z˜,z2).
26
Finally, to establish the monotonicity of a(·), suppose first that a′(z)≥0 for all z∈(z1,z2). The same
argument for (iii) above proves that amust be strictly increasing on (z1,z2). Suppose now that a′(z˜)<0 for
some z˜∈(z1,z2). Let Z⊆(z1,z2) be the largest interval containing z˜ s.t. a′(z)<0 for all z∈Z. Result (i)
immediately implies that infZ=z1. If supZ=z2, then a(·) is strictly decreasing on (z1,z2). If supZ<z2,
continuity of a′ implies that a′(supZ) = 0. Then, Result (iii) implies that a(·) is strictly increasing on
(supZ,z2). In summary, a(·) is either strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or first strictly decreasing
and then strictly increasing on (z1,z2).
Claim 5. Fix any z∗≤z1<z2 and suppose that a(z)∈(0,1) for all z∈(z1,z2). Then,
v(z)=
r1
r1+λ
u+
√
κRΦ
−1(D1ez+D2),∀z∈(z1,z2) (19)
and
a(z)=1+
√
2(r1+λ)
µ
φ
(
Φ−1(D1ez+D2)
)
D1ez
(20)
for someD1<0 andD2∈R, where κR := r
2
1c
2
2(r1+λ)µ2
.
Moreover, a(z) is strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or first strictly decreasing and then strictly
increasing on (z1,z2).
Proof. The idea of this proof is completely analogous to that of Claim 4. Fix any z∗≤z1<z2 such that
a(z)∈(0,1) for all z∈(z1,z2). In this case, equation (16) still holds. Substituting it into (10) and setting
b(z)=1, we have
v(z)=
r1
r1+λ
u+κR
v′′(z)−v′(z)
v′(z)2
.
It is easy to verify that its general solution is given by (19), and that the resulting a implied by (16) is given
by (20). Moreover, since a(z)∈(0,1), we must have v′(z)<0, i.e.,D1<0.
Analogous to (18), the following equation links a(z) to a′(z) in this case:
1−a(z)−a′(z)=2
(
v(z)− r1r1+λu
c
)(
r1+λ
r1
)
. (21)
The proof of equation (21) and the monotonicity of a(·) is along the same lines as in the proof of Claim
4, and is thus omitted.
Claim 6. If a(z˜)>0, then there are zL,zR such that zL<z˜<zR and a(zL)=a(zR)=0.
Proof. Let a(z˜)>0 and suppose, seeking a contradiction, that a(z)>0 for all z>z˜. Then, for all such z,
we would have (by Claim 1) v′(z)=− r1c
µ2[1−a(z)]≤−r1cµ2 . Taking the limit for arbitrary large z, we obtain
limz→+∞v(z)=−∞, a contradiction as v is always nonnegative. Similarly, if a(z)>0 for all z<z˜, then
limz→−∞v(z)=+∞, which contradicts that v is bounded above by u+c.
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Claim 7. For any z1,z2 such that either z1<z2≤z∗ or z∗≤z1<z2, a(z1)=a(z2)=0 implies a(z)=0
for all z∈ [z1,z2].
Proof. Fix any z1<z2≤ z∗ such that a(z1) =a(z2) = 0. Suppose (for a contradiction) that there exists
z˜∈(z1,z2) s.t. a(z˜)∈(0,1). Let Z be the largest interval containing z˜ such that a(z)∈(0,1) for all z∈Z.
Obviously, z1≤ infZ<supZ≤z2, and a(infZ)=a(supZ)=0 because a(·) is continuous. By Claim 4,
a(·) is strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or first strictly decreasing and then strictly increasing on
Z. Since a(infZ)=0, a(·) can only be strictly increasing on Z, but this contradicts the continuity of a(·)
at supZ. An analogous argument which invokes Claim 5 establishes same result for any z∗≤z1<z2 such
that a(z1)=a(z2)=0.
Corollary 2. One of the following must hold for any pseudo-best reply a(·):
• a(z)=0 for all z∈R;
• a(z) is hump-shaped (and maximized at z∗).
Proof. Suppose that a(·) is not always equal to 0. Then there exists z˜ s.t. a(z˜)>0. Let Z be the largest
interval containing z˜ such that a(z) > 0 for all z ∈ Z. Let zL = infZ and zR = supZ. By Claim 6,
−∞< zL < zR <∞. By continuity of a, a(zL) = a(zR) = 1. Then we must have z∗ ∈ (zL,zR), for
otherwise we would reach a contradiction to Claim 7. Moreover, for any z∈(zL,zR)c, we must have a(z)=0,
for otherwise we can construct another Z′ which also contains z∗ such that Z′−Z 6=∅, contradicting the
maximality ofZ. Since a(zL)=0, Claim 4 implies that a(·) must be strictly increasing on (zL,z∗). Similarly,
since a(zR)=0, Claim 5 implies that amust be strictly decreasing on (z∗,zR).
In summary, if a(·) is not always equal to 0, then there exist zL<zR s.t. a(·)=0 on (−∞,zL)∪(zR,∞),
a(·) is strictly increasing on (zL,z∗), and strictly decreasing on (z∗,zR); that is, a(·) is humped-shaped and
maximized at z∗.
Claim 8. a(·) is humped-shaped if and only if r1<r∗, where r∗ is the unique solution to (2).
Proof. (“Only if” part) Suppose first that a(·) is humped-shaped. We will show that this implies r1<r∗.
By Definition 3, there exist zL,zR s.t. −∞<zL<z∗<zR<∞ such that a(z)=0 on (−∞,zL]∪[zR,∞)
and a(z)∈(0,1) on (zL,zR). Let
v∗ :=v(z∗), vL :=v(zL), vR :=v(zR).
We now calculate the undetermined coefficients in Claims 2 to 5 (A1,A2,B1,B2,C1,C2,D1,D2 and
zR,zL,vR,vL) in various parts of the agent’s policy and value, as functions of v∗ and model parameters.
First, consider z<z∗. As z→−∞, the agent’s value function is given in Claim 2 by (12). Because v(·)
is bounded, we must have
A2 =0. (22)
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Note that Claim 1 implies that r1c=−µ2v′(zL), that is, v′(zL) =−r1cµ2 . By Claims 2 and 4, the value
function v(·) must satisfy the following value-matching and smoothing pasting conditions at zL and z∗:
u+c+A1e
ξLzL = vL, (value-matching at zL)
u+
√
κLΦ
−1(C1ezL+C2) = vL, (value-matching at zL)
u+
√
κLΦ
−1
(
C1e
z∗+C2
)
= v∗, (value-matching at z∗)
A1ξLe
ξLzL = − r1c
µ2
, (smooth-pasting at zL)
√
κLC1e
zL
φ
(
vL−u√
κL
) = − r1c
µ2
. (smooth-pasting at zL)
These five conditions can uniquely pin down the undetermined vector (vL,zL,A1,C1,C2) as:
vL=u+c− r1c
ξLµ2
, (23)
ezL=ez
∗
 √2r1µ φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
√
2r1
µ φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
+Φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
−Φ
(
v∗−u√
κL
)
, (24)
A1 =− r1c
ξLµ2
e−ξLzL (25)
C1 =e
−z∗
[
Φ
(
v∗−u√
κL
)
−Φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
−
√
2r1
µ
φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)]
, (26)
C2 =Φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
+
√
2r1
µ
φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
. (27)
Now, consider z>z∗. As z→∞, the agent’s value function is given in Claim 3 by (13). Because v(·)
is bounded, we must have
B2 =0. (28)
Note that Claim 1 implies that r1c=−µ2v′(zR), that is, v′(zR) =−r1cµ2 . By Claims 3 and 5, the value
function v(·) must satisfy the following value-matching conditions and smoothing-pasting at zR and z∗:
(u+c)
r1
r1+λ
+B1e
ξRzR = vR, (value-matching at zR)
r1
r1+λ
u+
√
κRΦ
−1(D1ezR+D2) = vR, (value-matching at zR)
r1
r1+λ
u+
√
κRΦ
−1
(
D1e
z∗+D2
)
= v∗, (value-matching at z∗)
B1ξRe
ξRzR = − r1c
µ2
, (smooth-pasting at zR)
√
κRD1e
zR
φ
(
v(zR)−
r1
r1+λ
u
√
κR
) = − r1c
µ2
. (smooth-pasting at zR)
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These five conditions can uniquely pin down the undetermined vector (vR,zR,B1,D1,D2) as:
vR=
r1
r1+λ
(u+c)− r1c
ξRµ2
, (29)
ezR =ez
∗

√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
+Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−Φ
(
v∗− r1
r1+λ
u
√
κR
)
, (30)
B1 =− r1c
ξRµ2
e−ξRzR, (31)
D1 =e
−z∗
[
Φ
(
v∗− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−
√
2(r1+λ)
µ
φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)]
, (32)
D2 =Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
+
√
2(r1+λ)
µ
φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
. (33)
Given v∗ and model parameters, equations (12) through (15), (19) and (20) with coefficients given by
(22) through (33) fully determine the agent’s policy function a(·) and his value function v(·) on R. Since
a(z)∈ (0,1) on (zL,zR), Claim 1 implies that v′(z)<0 on (zL,zR), which in turn implies that vL>vR.
Note that vL and vR are given by (23) and (29), both of which are independent of v∗. In particular, vL>vR
amounts to u+c− r1c
ξLµ2
> r1r1+λ(u+c)− r1cξRµ2 . Straightforward calculation shows that this is equivalent to
r1(
√
1+8r1/µ2+
√
1+8(r1+λ)/µ2)+λ(
√
1+8r1/µ2+1)<4λ
(
u
c +1
)
,
that is, r1<r∗ (see condition (2)). Therefore, we have shown that “a(·) is humped-shaped ⇒r1<r∗”, so
the “only if” part of the claim is proved.
(“If” part) Suppose now that a(·) is not hump-shaped. We will show that this implies r1 ≥ r∗. By
Corollary 2, we know that a(z)=0 for all z∈R. Then, by Claims 2 and 3, v(·) is given by (12) for z<z∗
and by (13) for z>z∗. We now pin down the undetermined coefficients (A1,A2,B1,B2) as functions of
model parameters. Since v(·) is bounded as z→−∞ or z→+∞, we must have
A2 =0, (34)
B2 =0. (35)
Also, the value function v(·) must satisfy the following value-matching and smoothing-pasting condition at z∗:
u+c+A1e
ξLz
∗
= r1r1+λ(u+c)+B1e
ξRz
∗
, (value-matching at z∗)
A1ξLe
ξLz
∗
=B1ξRe
ξRz
∗
. (smooth-pasting at z∗)
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These two conditions uniquely pin down (A1,B1) as:
A1 =
ξR
ξL−ξR
λ
r1+λ
(u+c)e−ξLz
∗
, (36)
B1 =
ξL
ξL−ξR
λ
r1+λ
(u+c)e−ξRz
∗
. (37)
Since a(z) = 0 for all z∈R, by Claim 1 we must have r1c≥−µ2v′(z) for all z∈R. In particular, this
should hold at z∗: r1c≥− ξRξLξL−ξR λr1+λ(u+c)µ2. Straightforward calculation shows that this is equivalent to
r1(
√
1+8r1/µ2+
√
1+8(r1+λ)/µ2)+λ(
√
1+8r1/µ2+1)≥4λ
(
u
c +1
)
,
that is, r1≥r∗ (see condition (2)). Therefore, we have shown that “a(·) is not humped-shaped ⇒r1≥r∗”,
so the “if” part of the claim is also proved.
In Claim 8, we find that if r1 < r∗, then a(·) is humped-shaped, in which case we can express all
coefficients and cutoffs in the agent’s policy and value functions in closed-form with respect to v∗ :=v(z∗)
and model parameters. However, v∗ itself is an endogenous object that needs to be determined. Our next
claim, proved in the Online Appendix, paves the final way for establishing Lemma 3.
Claim 9. Suppose that r1 < r∗, and let vL and vR be given by (23) and (29), respectively. Define
a∗−,a∗+ : [vR,vL]→R by
a∗−(x):=1−
√
2r1
µ φ
(
x−u√
κL
)
√
2r1
µ φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
+Φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
−Φ
(
x−u√
κL
) , (38)
a∗+(x):=1−
√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ
(
x− r1
r1+λ
u
√
κR
)
√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
+Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−Φ
(
x− r1
r1+λ
u
√
κR
) . (39)
Then, a∗−(·) is strictly decreasing on [vR,vL] with a∗−(vR) ∈ (0,1) and a∗−(vL) = 0; a∗+(·) is strictly
increasing on [vR,vL] with a∗+(vR)=0 and a∗+(vL)∈(0,1).
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose first that r1≥r∗. By Corollary 2 and Claim 8, any pseudo-best reply a(·) must
be such that a(z)=0 for all z∈R. Obviously, such function is unique. To verify that a(z)=0 for all z∈R
is indeed a solution to (6), note that we have shown in the proof of Claim 8 that, together with the v(·) given
by (12) and (13) and the coefficients given by (34) through (37), it satisfies the agent’s HJB equation (10).26
Since v(·) is bounded, we have limt→∞e−r1tE
[
v(zt)1{τ≥t}
]
=0, where τ is the stopping time when the
26 Everywhere except at z∗ where v′′ does not exist.
31
relationship is terminated. Then by Ross (2008, Theorem 3.3.5), a(z)=1 for all z∈R is indeed a solution to
(6). In addition, v(·) is regular because the functions given by (12) and (13) are smooth, and value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions are imposed at z∗.
Suppose now that r1<r∗. By Claim 8, any psuedo-best reply a(·) is humped-shaped. We first show that
such function, if it exists, must be unique. By Claims 2 to 5 and the proof of the “only if” part of Claim
8, such a policy function and the associated value function must satisfy (12) through (15), (19) and (20) with
coefficients given by (22) through (33), given the value v∗ :=v(z∗).
Recall that the functions a∗− and a∗+ are defined in (38) and (39), respectively. By Claim 4 and equations
(26) and (27), it is easy to verify that limz↑z∗a(z;v∗)=a∗−(v∗). Similarly, by Claim 5 and equations (32)
and (33), it is easy to verify that limz↓z∗a(z;v∗)=a∗+(v∗). Since a(·) is continuous at z∗, v∗ must satisfy
a∗−(v
∗)=a∗+(v
∗). (40)
By Claim 9, there is a unique v∗∈(vR,vL) satisfying (40), rendering the unique (candidate) policy function.
Finally, take such unique v∗, and let a(·) and v(·) be defined by (12) through (15), (19) and (20) with
coefficients given by (22) through (33). Exactly the same verification argument as in the case of r1≥r∗
confirms that a(·) indeed solves (6). In addition, v(·) is regular because the functions given by (12), (13), (14)
and (19) are smooth, and value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are imposed at zL, z∗ and zR.
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemmas 2 and 3 establish the unique structure of Markov equilibria. To prove Theorem 1, we still need
an argument for equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose first that r1≥r∗. By Lemma 3, the agent’s pseudo-best reply to any cutoff
termination rule satisfies that a(p)=0 for all p∈(0,1). In fact, the verification theorem we invoke in proving
Lemma 3 tells us that such a(·) satisfies the agent’s optimality condition (6) in a stronger sense, even if we
allow him to maximize over all admissible controls inA instead of over Markov controls inP∗. On the other
hand, given this Markovian strategy of the agent under which the belief span is (0,1), the proof of Lemma
2 (in the Online Appendix) can be used verbatim to show that the principal has a unique best reply whose
policy function b admits a cutoff p∗∈(0,1). Hence, such (a,b) is the unique Markov equilibrium in this case.
Suppose now that r1<r∗. Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that any Markov equilibrium (a,b)must be such that a
is humped-shaped and b has a cutoff structure. We now show that there exists a unique Markov equilibrium.
To show that a Markov equilibrium exists, note that the pseudo-best reply of the noninvestible agent
can be described by a function ϕ1 that maps a conjecture p˜∗ about the cutoff p∗ used by the principal into
a policy function a(·) defined on (0,1), the probability-domain version of the policy function in z−space
constructed in Claim 8’s proof. The function ϕ1 is continuous.27 Moreover, the best reply of the principal
27 This follows from Lemma OA.1 in the Online Appendix, i.e., the translation invariance of the agent’s problem.
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can be described by a function ϕ2 that maps any Markov strategy α of the noninvestible agent into a unique
cutoff p∗, and Lemma 2 also tells us that p∗∈ [p∗∗,pH]⊂(0,1).28
Define the composition ϕ :=ϕ2·ϕ1 that maps each conjecture p˜∗ into the associated optimal cutoff p∗.29
The mapping ϕ satisfies
ϕ(p˜∗)= argmax
p′∈[p∗∗,pH ]
Mˆ(p,p′,p˜∗),
where
Mˆ(p,p′,p˜∗):=r2
∫ +∞
0
∫ 1
p′
e−r2tR(q)dΓ(t,q|p˜∗,p)
and Γ is the joint probability measure of getting the first Poisson shock in the stopping region [p′,1) at
time t and state p˜, when the prior belief at time zero is p. Notice that ϕ(p∗) is the unique solution to this
maximization problem and is independent of the prior due to its Markovian nature. Moreover, Mˆ(p,p′,p˜∗)
is jointly continuous in (p′,p˜∗). Since the choice space is compact and the objective is continuous in both
the choice variable p′ and the “parameter” p˜∗, the Maximum Theorem implies that ϕ is continuous.
Since ϕ is a continuous function mapping from (0,1) to [p∗∗,pH] such that liminfp→0[ϕ(p)−p]≥p∗∗>0
and limsupp→1[ϕ(p)−p]≤pH−1<0, the intermediate value theorem implies that there must be p∗∈(0,1)
such that ϕ(p∗)=p∗. Taking any such p∗, it is easy to verify that
(
a∗ :=ϕ1(p∗),b∗ :=1{pt≥p∗}
)
represents
a Markov equilibrium. This proves equilibrium existence.
To show that the Markov equilibrium is unique, let (a,b) be a Markov equilibrium in which the principal
uses a threshold p∗, associated with a likelihood z∗. Consider the payoff of the principal when deviating
to a different threshold z′ when the state is z.
M(z,z′,z∗):=p(z)E
{
e−r2TNI(z,z
′,z∗)
}
wNI+(1−p(z))E
{
e−r2TI(z,z
′,z∗)
}
wI,
where Tθ(z,z′,z∗) is the random time of occurrence of the first Poisson shock that arrives while the state lies
in the stopping interval [z′,+∞), provided the initial state is z and the dynamics is conditioned on type θ∈
{I,NI}. By the conditional translation invariance property proved in Lemma OA.2 of the Online Appendix,
E
{
e−r2Tθ(z,z
′,z∗)
}
=E
{
e−r2Tθ(0,z
′−z,z∗−z)
}
for all z,z′,z∗∈R. The FOC of the principal is
∂M(z,z′,z∗)
∂z′
=p(z)DNI(z,z
′,z∗)wNI+(1−p(z))DI(z,z′,z∗)wI=0,
28 Lemma 2 is stated for an equilibrium. However, its proof is applicable to the principal’s best reply to any
Markovian strategy of the agent.
29 Note that SP [ϕ1(p˜∗)]=(0,1) for all p˜∗∈(0,1), because the pseudo-best reply delivered by Lemma 3 (derived
in Claim 8’s proof) is always bounded away from 1 by a positive number and thus the diffusion coefficient of the
belief process is bounded away from 0.
33
where we define Dθ(z,z′,z∗) :=
∂E
{
e−r2Tθ(z,z
′,z∗)
}
∂z′ for each θ ∈ {I,NI}, z,z′,z∗ ∈ R. Note that this
condition should hold for every z∈R. In equilibrium, the principal’s choice of z′ must coincide with z∗,
so the FOC becomes: p(z)DNI(z,z∗,z∗)wNI+(1−p(z))DI(z,z∗,z∗)wI=0, which can be rewritten as:
p(z)=
DC(z,z
∗,z∗)wC
DC(z,z∗,z∗)wC−DS(z,z∗,z∗)wS .
Evaluating the limit from below as z↑z∗, we have
p∗=p(z∗)=
DC(z
∗,z∗,z∗)wC
DC(z∗,z∗,z∗)wC−DS(z∗,z∗,z∗)wS =
DC(0,0,0)wC
DC(0,0,0)wC−DS(0,0,0)wS ,
where the last equality follows from Lemma OA.2 in the Online Appeneix, i.e., the conditional translation
invariance of the principal’s payoff function. Since the RHS is independent of p∗, we conclude that there
can be at most one value p∗ consistent with a Markov equilibrium, establishing the uniqueness claim.
Corollary 3. The following hold:
1. W(·) is (weakly) increasing, nonnegative and convex on (0,1), and it satisfies limp→0W(p)=0 and
limp→1W(p)= λr2+λwNI .
2. v(·) is strictly decreasing on R, and it satisfies limz→−∞ v(z) = u + c and limz→∞ v(z) =
r1
r1+λ
(u+c). Moreover, v(·) is concave on (−∞,z∗) and convex on (z∗,∞).
Proof. See Online Appendix.
A.2 Expected Performance: Toward a Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2 which is about the non-monotonicity of the expected performance.
Given a Markov equilibrium (a,b) (where the equilibrium policy functions are defined on the z−space),
let v be the agent’s value function, z∗ be the principal’s termination cutoff, and recall that the agent’s expected
performance is given by
EP(z)=µ[1−(1−a(z))p(z)], (41)
where p(z)= e
z
1+ez . Our analyses in this section fix all model parameters, except r1 and/or λ.
Lemma 4. If r1 ≥ r∗, then EP(·) is strictly decreasing on R. If r1 < r∗, then either EP(·) is strictly
decreasing on R, orEP(·) is
• strictly decreasing for z<z, where z is some number in [zL,z∗);
• strictly increasing for z∈(z,z∗);
• strictly decreasing for z>z∗.
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Proof. If r1≥ r∗, Theorem 1 tells us that a(z) = 0 for all z ∈R. Thus, EP(z) =µ[1−p(z)], which is
strictly decreasing on R.
If r1<r∗, by Theorem 1 the agent’s equilibrium policy function a is humped-shaped, with cutoffs denoted
by zL and zR such that a(z)> 0 if and only if z ∈ (zL,zR). Obviously, EP(·) is strictly decreasing on
(−∞,zL) and on (z∗,∞), because on each of these intervals a(·) is weakly decreasing and p(·) is strictly
increasing in z. We now focus on the monotonicity ofEP(·) on (zL,z∗).
First, analogous to (18), we establish the following equality which linksEP(z) toEP ′(z):
µ−EP(z)−EP
′(z)
p(z)
=2µ
(
v(z)−u
c
)
. (42)
To see this, note first that since a(z)>0 on (zL,z∗), by equation (41) and Claim 1 we have
µ−EP(z)=µ[1−a(z)]p(z)=−r1c
µ
p(z)
v′(z)
. (43)
Differentiating this expression, we obtain
−EP ′(z)=−r1c
µ
(
−v
′′(z)p(z)
v′(z)2
+
p(z)[1−p(z)]
v′(z)
)
=µ[1−a(z)]p(z)
(
−v
′′(z)
v′(z)
+1−p(z)
)
.
where the first equality follows from p′(z)=p(z)[1−p(z)] and the second equality follows from (43). Recall,
from the agent’s HJB (17) in this case, that
v′′(z)
v′(z)
=1+
[v(z)−u]v′(z)
κL
=1−2
(
v(z)−u
c
)
1
1−a(z) ,
where the second equality follows from Claim 1 and κL= r1c
2
2µ2
. Thus,
−EP
′(z)
p(z)
=µ[1−a(z)]
[
2
(
v(z)−u
c
)
1
1−a(z)−p(z)
]
=2µ
(
v(z)−u
c
)
−µ[1−a(z)]p(z)
=2µ
(
v(z)−u
c
)
−[µ−EP(z)],
where the last equality follows from (43). Equation (42) then follows immediately.
From equation (42), we can apply the same argument as that after equation (18) to show thatEP(·) must
be either strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or first strictly decreasing and then strictly increasing on
(zL,z
∗), a property that echoes what we have shown for the policy function a(·) in Claim 4. Since we know
thatEP(·) is strictly decreasing on (−∞,zL) and on (z∗,∞), the result in the lemma follows.
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The following Corollary is immediately implied by Lemma 4.
Corollary 4. EP(·) is non-monotone if and only if r1<r∗ andEP ′−(z∗)>0.
To determine whetherEP(·) is non-monotone, we only need to look at the left derivative ofEP at z∗.
An analysis ofEP ′−(z∗) leads to the next lemma.
Lemma 5. EP(·) is non-monotone if and only if r1 < r∗ and [1− a(z∗)]p(z∗) > 2
(
v∗−u
c
)
, where
v∗ :=v(z∗).
Proof. Since a(z)>0 on (zL,z∗], by Claim 1 and equation (14) we have
1−a(z)=− r1c
µ2v′(z)
∝
φ
(
v(z)−u√
κL
)
ez
,∀z∈(zL,z∗]. (44)
Then,
EP ′−(z
∗)>0
⇐⇒ d
dz
[(1−a(z))p(z)]
∣∣∣∣
z=z∗−
<0 (by (41))
⇐⇒ −a′(z)p(z)+[1−a(z)]p(z)[1−p(z)]∣∣
z=z∗−
<0 (because p′(z)=p(z)[1−p(z)])
⇐⇒ [1−a(z)]p(z)
[
− a
′(z)
1−a(z) +1−p(z)
]∣∣∣∣
z=z∗−
<0
⇐⇒ [1−a(z)]p(z)
[
dln[1−a(z)]
dz
+1−p(z)
]∣∣∣∣
z=z∗−
<0
⇐⇒ dln[1−a(z)]
dz
+1−p(z)
∣∣∣∣
z=z∗−
<0 (because a(z)<1 for all z)
⇐⇒ d
dz
[
lnφ
(
v(z)−u√
κL
)
−z
]
+1−p(z)
∣∣∣∣
z=z∗−
<0 (by (44))
⇐⇒
(
−v
∗−u√
κL
)(
v′(z∗)√
κL
)
−p(z∗)<0 (because dlnφ(x)/dx=−x)
⇐⇒ v
∗−u
κL
<− p(z
∗)
v′(z∗)
(because−v′(z∗)>0)
⇐⇒ v
∗−u
κL
r1c
µ2
<− p(z
∗)
v′(z∗)
r1c
µ2
⇐⇒ 2
(
v∗−u
c
)
< [1−a(z∗)]p(z∗) (by κL= r1c22µ2 and (44))
By Corollary 4, the result follows.
Lemma 5 immediately implies the following corollary.
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Corollary 5. EP(·) is non-monotone if r1<r∗ and v∗<u.
For a given λ, recall that r∗(λ) is the unique solution to (2). It is easy to see that there exists a unique
λ1>0 such that
r∗(λ1)=µ2. (45)
Consequently, r∗(λ)>µ2 if and only if λ>λ1.
The following lemma deals with the agent’s discount rates that are close to r∗(λ).
Lemma 6. If λ>λ1 and µ2<r1<r∗(λ), thenEP(·) is non-monotone.
Proof. Recall that, in the proof of Claim 8, we have shown that if a(·) is humped-shape, then vL :=v(zL)
and vR :=v(zR) are calculated in (23) and (29), respectively. Moreover, vL>vR if (and only if) r1<r∗(λ),
and since v′(·)<0, we have v∗∈(vR,vL).
From (23), it is easy to verify that vL<u if and only if r1>µ2. Therefore, if λ>λ1 and µ2<r1<r∗(λ),
we have vR<v∗<vL<u. By Corollary 5,EP(·) is non-monotone.
What about r1∈(0,µ2]? For λ>λ1 and r1≤µ2, recall that the functions a∗−(·;r1),a∗+(·;r1,λ):[vR,vL]→
R are defined by (38) and (39), respectively. Recall also, from the proof of Lemma 3, that v∗∈(vR,vL) is
the unique solution to a∗−(x;r1)=a∗+(x;r1,λ).
Claim 10. If λ>λ1 and r1≤µ2, then u∈ [vR,vL]. Moreover, v∗<u if and only if a∗−(u;r1)<a∗+(u;r1,λ).
Proof. Suppose that λ>λ1 and r1≤µ2. First, by definition of λ1 in (45), we have r∗(λ)>µ2≥r1, so
the equilibrium a(·) is hump-shaped and vL>vR. Substituting the expressions of ξL and ξR into (23) and
(29), we can rewrite vL and vR as
vL(r1)=u+c
(
1−
√
1+8r1/µ2+1
4
)
,
vR(r1,λ)=
r1
r1+λ
[
u+c
(
1+
√
1+8(r1+λ)/µ2−1
4
)]
.
It is easy to verify that vL is strictly decreasing in r1 and vR is strictly increasing in r1. Thus, for λ>λ1
and r1≤µ2,
vR(r1,λ)<vR(r
∗(λ),λ)=vL(r∗(λ))<vL(µ2)≤vL(r1)
where the inequalities follow from the monotonicity of vL and vR in r1, and the equality follows from the
definition of r∗. Note that vL(µ2)=u, so we have u∈ [vR,vL].
The fact that u ∈ [vR,vL] implies that a∗−(u;r1) and a∗+(u;r1,λ) are well-defined. By Claim 9, the
function g : [vR,vL]→R defined by g(x;r1,λ):=a∗−(x;r1)−a∗+(x;r1,λ) is strictly decreasing in x, and v∗
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is the unique zero point of g(·;r1,λ) on [vR,vL]. Therefore,
v∗<u⇐⇒ g(u;r1,λ)<0⇐⇒ a∗−(u;r1)<a∗+(u;r1,λ),
as desired.
The next lemma deals with the case where the agent’s discount rate r1 is small.
Lemma 7. There exist λ2≥λ1 and r>0, such that if λ>λ2 and 0<r1<r, thenEP(·) is non-monotone.
Proof Sketch. For a formal proof, see Online Appendix. Intuitively, when r1 is near zero, both a∗−(u;r1) and
a∗+(u;r1,λ) are close to 1, but a+(u;r1,λ) converges at a much faster rate than a−(u;r1) does (i.e., e−1/r
2
1
v.s.
√
r1). So, when r1 is close to zero, we easily have a∗−(u;r1)<a∗+(u;r1,λ). Then, by Claim 10 and
Corollary 5, the result follows. In our proof, we show that the bounds λ2 and r in the lemma can be obtained
independent of each other.
We note that the bound r obtained in Lemma 7 is a fixed number independent of λ. We now turn to the
last case where r1∈ [r,µ2].
Claim 11. There exist λ′3≥λ1 andA>1 such that if λ>λ′3, then
a∗+(u;r1,λ)>1−Aexp
(
− µ
2
c2r21
λ2
r1+λ
u2
)
,∀r1∈ [r,µ2]. (46)
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Lemma 8. There exists λ3≥λ1 such that if λ>λ3 and r≤r1≤µ2, thenEP(·) is non-monotone.
Proof. Let λ′3≥λ1 and A> 1 be delivered by Claim 11. For each r1 ∈ [r,µ2], let λ(r1) be the unique
solution on R+ toAexp
(
− µ2
c2r21
λ2
r1+λ
u2
)
=1−a∗−(u;r1). Note that λ(r1) is well-defined for all r1∈ [r,µ2]
because the LHS is strictly decreasing in λ while the RHS is independent of λ.30 Hence, we have
Aexp
(
− µ
2
c2r21
λ2
r1+λ
u2
)
<1−a∗−(u;r1),∀λ>λ(r1). (47)
Also, λ(r1) is continuous in r1 by the implicit function theorem. Let λ′′3 := maxr∈[r,µ2] λ(r) and
λ3 :=max{λ′3,λ′′3}. Combining (46) and (47), we have
a∗+(u;r1,λ)>1−Aexp
(
− µ
2
c2r21
λ2
r1+λ
u2
)
>a−(u;r1), for all λ>λ3 and r1∈ [r,µ2].
Then, by Claim 10 and Corollary 5, we conclude thatEP(·) is non-monotone if λ>λ3 and r1∈ [r,µ2].
30 Moreover, when λ = 0, the LHS is equal to A > 1 − a∗−(u;r1); when λ → ∞, the LHS converges to
0<1−a∗−(u;r1).
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Proof of Theorem 2. Let λ1 be defined in (45), and let λ2 and λ3 be delivered by Lemmas 7 and 8, respec-
tively. Define λ¯ :=max{λ1,λ2,λ3}. Lemmas 6 through 8 imply that if λ>λ¯ and r1<r∗(λ), thenEP(·)
is non-monotone. Lemma 4 then leads to the conclusion of the theorem.
A.3 Effects of Better Transparency: Toward a Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we prove Theorem 3 which is about the convergence of the principal’s equilibrium value
function when the signal-to-noise ratio µ grows without bound.
Take any sequence {µn}n such that limnµn=+∞. For each n∈N, take the unique Markov equilibrium
(an,bn) associated with the signal-to-noise ratio µn. Let Vn(·) be the agent’s value function in the equilibrium
(an,bn) and Wn(·) be the principal’s value function. We will often use z≡ log(p/1−p) as state variable
when analyzing the agent’s behavior. When doing so, we denote by vn(z) :=Vn(p(z)) the agent’s value
function in the z−space. Write z∗n for the principal’s equilibrium cutoff. Write zL,n for the infimum belief
z at which the agent plays an(z)>0 and write zR,n for the supremum. Write T for the equilibrium stopping
time that stops the play of the game. Without labeling explicitly, we note that the distribution of T depends
on n and the current state z. For i=1,2, let Eθn
{
e−riT
}
be the expected discount factor when the stopping
action is taken in the equilibrium (an,bn) discounted at rate ri and given the equilibrium strategy of type
θ∈{NI,I}. When the game starts at state z, let
En
{
e−riT
}
:=p(z)ENIn
{
e−riT
}
+(1−p(z))EIn
{
e−riT
}
.
A.3.1 Case 1: λ<r1
(
c
u
)
, i.e., u< r1
r1+λ
(u+c)
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3. We first show that there is ε>0 such that an(z∗n)<1−ε for all n. Without
loss, assume that an(z∗n)>0 for all n. Then condition (18) implies that
an(z
∗
n)=1−2
(
vn(z
∗
n)−u
c
)
−a′n
(
z∗n−
)
<1−2
(
r1
r1+λ
(u+c)−u
c
)
,
where the inequality follows from vn(·)≥ r1r1+λ(u+c) and a′n(z∗n−)>0. By the assumption of Case 1, we
can set ε=2
( r1
r1+λ
(u+c)−u
c
)
>0.
Since an(·) is maximized at z∗n, the above implies that an(·) is uniformly bounded away from 1. Con-
sequently, as µn→∞, the principal learns the agent’s type almost immediately, and thus the principal’s
equilibrium value functionWn(·) converges uniformly to her full-information value function W¯(·).
A.3.2 Case 2: λ>r1
(
c
u
)
, i.e., u> r1
r1+λ
(u+c)
Claim 12. There existsN∈N such that whenever n≥N , an(·) is hump-shaped.
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Proof. From condition (2), it is easily verified that limnr∗n=λ
(
2u
c +1
)
. The assumption of Case 2 implies
that r1<λ
(
u
c
)
<λ
(
2u
c +1
)
. By Theorem 1, the result follows.
We assume n≥N for the rest of the proofs in Case 2.
Claim 13. Take any compact set [p1,p2]⊂(0,1). We have limsupn→∞
[
maxz∈[z(p1),z(p2)]vn(z)
]≤u.
Proof. Beacuse p∗∈ [p∗∗,pH] (by Lemma 2), we can without loss assume that p∗n∈ [p1,p2]. Since vn(·) is
decreasing, it suffices to show that limsupvn
(
z
(p1
2
))≤u.
By Claim 12, an(·) is hump-shaped for all n. First assume that an(z∗n)→1. Take any ε>0, and let zεn
be the smallest z such that an(z)=1−ε, which is well-defined for every large n such that an(z∗n)>1−ε.
Consider the stochastic process Zt in the equilibrium (an,bn) under the noninvestible-type strategy and the
initial condition Z0 =z
(p1
2
)
. Let T†n be the stopping time that stops the game at the first time that Zt≥zεn.
From the law of motion (9), as µn→∞, we have ENIn
[
e−r1T
†
n
]
→ 1 and hence vn
(
z
(p1
2
))→ vn(zεn).
Moreover, since vn(·) is decreasing and concave to the left of znε (by Corollary 3), we have
r1vn(z
n
ε ) = r1[u+(1−an(znε ))c]+
1
2
µ2[1−an(znε )]2
[
v′
(
an
(
znε−
))
+v′′
(
an
(
znε−
))]
≤ r1[u+(1−an(znε ))c],
which implies vn(znε )≤u+εc, delivering the result as ε is arbitrary.
Next assume that liminf an (z∗n) < 1. Take an  > 0 such that u >
r1
r1+λ
(u+ c) + ; such an 
exists because of the assumption of Case 2. Notice that we can find a z† sufficiently large such that
vn
(
z†
)
< r1r1+λ(u+c)+,∀n.31 Let T
†
n be the stopping time that stops the game at the first time that Zt=z†.
As µn→∞, we have vn
(
z
(p1
2
))→vn(z†)< r1r1+λ(u+c)+<u.
Claim 14. limn→∞zL,n=−∞.
Proof. Recall that vn(zL,n)=vL,n whose expression is given by (24), i.e., vL,n=u+c
(
1−
√
1+8r1/µ2n+1
4
)
.
It is easy to see that limnvn(zL,n)=u+ c2 . Assume toward a contradiction, taking a subsequence if necessary,
that limnzL,n = z >−∞. Then for any ε> 0, we have zL,n ∈ [z−ε,z+ε] and vn(zL,n)≥u+ c4 when
n is sufficiently large. Take any ε<(0,c/4). By Claim 13 and the monotonicity of vn(·), there exists n∗
such that for every n>n∗ and for every z∈ [z−ε,z+ε], we have vn(z)<u+ε<u+ c4 , a contradiction
to vL,n→u+ c2 and zL,n→z.
Claim 15. For any κ>0, we have limn→∞an(z∗n−κ)=1.
31 To see this, note first that p∗n is bounded above by pH < 1 (Lemma 2). Next observe that the posterior is a
submartingale according to the strategy of the noninvestible type. This implies that for every η>0 we can find pη<1
such that, conditional on the noninvestible-type strategy, p∈ (pη,1) implies that the posterior goes below pH with
probability less than η. This immediately easily implies the existence of said z†.
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Proof. Assume toward a contradiction that, taking a subsequence if necessary, liman(z∗n−κ)=1−2ε for
some ε>0. Take any large M>0 and notice that Claim 14 tells us that zL,n<z∗n−κ−M for large n.
Since an(·) is increasing on [z∗n−κ−M,z∗n−κ] and liman(z∗n−κ)=1−2ε, we know that an(z)<1−ε
(infinitely often) for all z∈ [z∗n−κ−M,z∗n−κ]. Recall from condition (18) that for z∈ [z∗n−κ−M,z∗n−κ],
a′n(z)=1−an(z)−2
(
vn(z)−u
c
)
,
implying, in light of Claim 13, that for n sufficiently large, we have a′n(z)>
ε
2 for all z∈ [z∗n−κ−M,z∗n−κ].
But then, we can takeM large enough such that an(z∗n−κ−M)<0, a contradiction.
Claim 16. For any κ>0, we have limn→∞vn(z∗n−κ)=u.
Proof. From Claim 13 and Lemma 2 , we know limsupvn(z∗n−κ)≤u. Assume toward a contradiction,
taking a subsequence if necessary, that limn→∞vn(z∗n−κ) = u−2ε for some ε> 0. This implies that
vn(z
∗
n−κ)< u− ε for n sufficiently large. Note also that Claim 14 tells us that z∗n−κ > zL,n for n
sufficiently large. From condition (18), a′n(z) = 1−an(z)−2
(
vn(z)−u
c
)
for all z ∈ [z∗n−κ,z∗n− κ2 ].
Then by Claim 15 and the monotonicity of an(·), we know that for n sufficiently large, a′n(z)> εc for all
z∈ [z∗n−κ,z∗n− κ2 ]. But then, we have an(z∗n−κ)<1−
(
κ
2
)(
ε
c
)
, a contradiction to Claim 15.
Claim 17. Fix a prior p0∈(0,1) and some p¯∈(p0,1). For each µ>0, consider an adapted Markov function
αµ(·) and a belief process defined by substituting αµ(·) into (7). Take ε>0 and let T¯ be the random time
that stops the play in the first time that p≥ p¯. Then we have:
limsup
µ↑∞
ENI
{
r1
∫ T¯
0
e−r1tI{αµ(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
=0.
Proof. See Online Appendix (Section B.3, and Lemma OA.5 in Section B.4). In words, this lemma says
that if the noninvestible type does not mimic too often, then as the noise in the signal vanishes, the principal
can learn the agent’s type almost immediately.
Lemma 9. Fix any κ>0 and, for each n∈N, assume that the game starts at the prior z∗n−κ. Let T∗n be
the stopping time that stops the play in the first time that a posterior reaches [z∗n,∞).We have:
limsup
n→∞
ENIn
[
e−r1T
∗
n
]
=0.
Proof. Let zˆn :=z∗n−κ and zn :=z∗n−2κ. Let Tn(zn) be the stopping time that stops the play in the first
time that the posterior reaches zn and Tn(z∗n) be the stopping time that stops the play in the first time that
the posterior reaches z∗n. Observe that for any n, PNIn [Tn(zn)<∞]+PNIn [Tn(z∗n)<∞]=1.
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By Claim 15, we know that for any ε>0, there exists n1∈N such that n>n1 implies that vn(zˆ∗n) is
bounded above by:
PNIn [Tn(zn)<∞]ENIn
[∫ Tn(zn)
0
ue−r1tdt+e−r1Tn(zn)vn(zn) |Tn(zn)<∞
]
+PNIn [Tn(z∗n)<∞]ENIn
[∫ Tn(z∗n)
0
ue−r1tdt+e−r1Tn(z
∗
n)vn(z
∗
n) |Tn(z∗n)<∞
]
+ε.
(48)
Next we obtain an upper bound for vn(z∗n). For that, we let Tλ be the random time of the next Poisson
shock. Note that
vn(z
∗
n)= PNIn [zTλ>z
∗
n]EθSn
[∫ Tλ
0
e−r1t[u+(1−an(zt))c]dt |zTλ>z∗n
]
+PNIn [zTλ≤z∗n]EθSn
[∫ Tλ
0
e−r1t[u+(1−an(zt))c]dt+e−r1Tλvn(zTλ) |zTλ≤z∗n
]
.
Now we use the following facts to bound the expected value above:
i) Because an(zt)≥0,
ENIn
[∫ Tλ
0
e−r1t[u+(1−an(zt))c]dt |zTλ>z∗n
]
≤ENIn
[∫ Tλ
0
e−r1t(u+c)dt |zTλ>z∗n
]
.
ii) From Claim 13,
limsupENIn
[
I{zTλ≤z∗n}vn(zTλ)
]
≤ limsupENIn
[
I{zTλ≤z∗n}u
]
.
iii) For every ε>0, from Claim 17,
limsupPNIn
[
{zTλ≤z∗n}∩
{∫ Tλ
0
e−r1t(1−a(zt))dt>ε
}]
=0.
Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) above imply that for every >0, we can find n2∈Nwith n2>n1 such that n>n2
implies vn(z∗n)≤PNIn [zTλ>z∗n]ENIn
[∫ Tλ
0 e
−r1t(u+c)dt |zTλ>z∗n
]
+PθSn [zTλ≤z∗n]u+. Since Poisson
shocks are independent of the Brownian motion, ENIn
[∫ Tλ
0 e
−r1t(u+c)dt |zTλ>z∗n
]
=
(
r
r+λ
)
(u+c)<u.
Moreover, notice that the zt (and pt) are submartingales conditional on θ=NI, so PNIn [zTλ>z∗n]≥ 12 .
Therefore, the last two observations imply
vn(z
∗
n)≤
1
2
(
r1
r1+λ
)
(u+c)+
1
2
u+.
Since
(
r1
r1+λ
)
(u+c)<u and  is arbitrary, we conclude that limsupvn(z∗n)<u.
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Going back to the upper bound (48) for vn(zˆ∗n), we have shown that limsupvn(z∗n)<u, and from Claim
16, we know that limvn(zˆ∗n)=limvn(z∗n)=u. So for (48) to be an valid upper bound of vn(zˆ∗n) for arbitrary
ε, we must have limsupn→∞ENIn
[
e−r1Tn(z∗n)
]
=0, i.e., limsupn→∞ENIn
[
e−r1T∗n
]
=0, as desired.
Lemma 10. limn→∞z∗n=z∗∗, where z∗∗ is the myopic cutoff satisfyingR(p(z∗∗))=0
Proof. Recall that we always have z∗n≥z∗∗. Hence assume (toward a contradiction) that we can find some
ε>0 such that, taking a subsequence if necessary, z∗n>z∗∗+ε for every n. For every n, consider the game
starts at z∗n− ε2 >z∗∗+ ε2 . Let T∗n be the stopping time that stops the play in the first time that a posterior
reaches [z∗n,∞). By Lemma 9, we have ENIn
[
e−r1T∗n
]→0, implying that limsupWn(p(z∗n− ε2))≤0. But
since z∗n− ε2>z∗∗+ ε2 , the principal can get a strictly positive payoff by terminating the relationship when the
next stopping opportunity arrives. So the principal has a profitable deviation at z∗n− ε2 when n is sufficiently
large, a contradiction.
Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 3. In light of Corollary 3, we extend eachWn continuously from (0,1) to [0,1]
by settingWn(0)=0 andWn(1)= λr2+λwNI .
We first show that Wn(·) converges to W(p∗∗) = 0. By Lemmas 9 and 10, it is easy to see that
limn→∞Wn(p)=0 for all p<p∗∗.32 Suppose toward a contradiction, taking a subsequence if necessary,
that limn→∞Wn(p∗∗) = δ > 0. Let =
δ(1−p∗∗)
2wNI
. For n large enough, we have Wn(p∗∗−)< δ2 . Since
Wn(·) is convex (by Corollary 3), we have Wn(1)−Wn(p
∗∗)
1−p∗∗ ≥Wn(p
∗∗)−Wn(p∗∗−)
 ≥ wNI1−p∗∗ , which implies
Wn(1)>wNI , a contradiction.
Next, for each n, because Wn(0) =W(0), Wn(1) =W(1), and Wn(·) is increasing and convex, we
have 0≤W ′n(·)≤ λr1+λ . But then, we always have p∗∗=argmaxp∈[0,1]|Wn(p)−W(p)|. Hence, uniform
convergence ofWn follows immediately from its pointwise convergence at p∗∗.
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Omitted Proofs for Theorem 1
B.1.1 Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
Consider a Markovian equilibrium, (α,β), and the underlying probability space (Ω,F,P). For each p∈(0,1),
we define Φ(p) := {ω∈Ω:∃t≤T such that pt(ω)=p}, where T is the random stopping time of the re-
lationship induced by (α,β). The belief span, SP(α), is the set of all p such that P(Φ(p))> 0. Clearly,
SP(α) is a connected set because the sample path of Xt is almost surely continuous. Let p := infSP(α),
and p¯ :=supSP(α). Define the principal’s value function W as in the main text on the domain of SP(α).
The functionW is continuous because the agent’s equilibrium policy function a∈P.
Claim OA.1. SP(α) is an open interval. That is, SP(α)=(p,p¯).
Proof. Since SP(α) is a connected set, we only need to show that p¯,p /∈ SP(α). Suppose, toward a
contradiction, that p¯∈SP(α). Then, consider a history that leads to the belief p¯ and the continuation play
starting from this history. Since the belief process is a martingale, we must have pt= p¯ for all t≤T and
almost all sample paths. Agent’s optimality then implies a(p¯)=0,and thus the diffusion coefficient of the
belief process at p¯ is strictly positive. This contradicts pt= p¯ for all t≤T and almost all sample paths. The
same argument proves that p /∈SP(α).
Claim OA.2. The principal’s equilibrium policy function b has a cutoff structure on SP(α). That is, there
exists a unique p∗∈ [p,p¯] such that p∈(p,p∗) implies b(p)=0 and p∈(p∗,p¯) implies b(p)=1.
Proof. Recall that R(p) := pwNI + (1− p)wI is the principal’s expected payoff if the relationship is
terminated when her belief is p. For any p∈SP(α), define F(p):=W(p)−R(p). At any time t such that
the stopping opportunity arrives, given her belief pt=p∈SP(α), if the principal terminates the relationship,
her expected payoff isR(p); if the principal continues the relationship, her continuation value isW(p). Thus,
principal’s optimality requires that b(p)=1 if F(p)<0 and that b(p)=0 if F(p)>0.
We first establish two useful properties of F .
Property 1: If F(p˜)>0 at some p˜∈SP(α), then F(p)>0 for all p<p˜.
To see this, suppose thatF(p˜)>0 at some p˜∈SP(α). Let (pa,pb) be the largest interval containing p˜ such
that F(p)>0 for all p∈(pa,pb). We want to show that pa=p. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that pa>p.
SinceW is continuous, we have F(pa)=0, i.e.,W(pa)=R(pa). Moreover, principal’s optimality requires
that b(p)=0 for all p∈(pa,pb). We consider two cases, and will reach a contradiction in each of these cases.
Case 1: pb<p¯.
In this case, continuity ofW also implies that F(pb)=0, i.e.,W(pb)=R(pb). Consider now a history
that leads to the belief p˜ and the continuation play starting from this history. Let T† be the first time that the
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posterior belief reaches (pa,pb)
c (setting T†=∞ if this event is not reached in finite time). Let ϕ represent
the probability measure (from the principal’s perspective) induced by the distribution of pT†. Then,
R(p˜)<W(p˜)=
∫ pb
pa
W(p)E
[
e−r2T
† |pT†=p
]
ϕ(dp)
=
∫ pb
pa
R(p)E
[
e−r2T
† |pT†=p
]
ϕ(dp)<
∫ pb
pa
R(p)ϕ(dp)=R(p˜).
The second equality trivially holds if E
[
e−r2T† |pT†=p
]
=0, and otherwise if T†<∞, then it holds because
W(pT†) =R(pT†). The last inequality uses the facts that 0≤W(pa) =R(pa) implies R(p)> 0 for all
p>pa, and that T†>0 almost surely. The final equality holds because pt is a bounded martingale andR(·)
is an affine function. But then, we have an obvious contradiction.
Case 2: pb= p¯.
In this case, we have b(p) = 0 for all p ∈ (pa,p¯). Consider again a history that leads to the belief p˜
and the continuation play starting from this history. Let T† be the first time that the posterior reaches pa
(setting T†=∞ if this event is not reached in finite time). Let ϕ represent the probability measure (from
the principal’s perspective) induced by the distribution of pT†. Then,
R(p˜)<W(p˜)=W(pa)E
(
e−rT
†)
<R(pa),
which contradictsR being increasing.
Property 2: Let p∗ :=sup{p∈SP(α):F(p)>0}.33 Then, F(p)<0 for all p>p∗.
By definition of p∗, we know that F(p)≤0 for all p≥p∗, i.e.,W(p)≤R(p) for all p≥p∗, so it is weakly
optimal for the principal to terminate the relationship whenever p∈(p∗,p¯). Suppose, toward a contradiction,
that F(p˜)=0 for some p˜>p∗. Consider a history that leads to the belief p˜ and the continuation play starting
from this history. Let T† be the first time that the stopping opportunity arrives or the posterior reaches p∗
(setting T†=∞ if this event is not reached in finite time). Let ϕ represent the probability measure (from
the principal’s perspective) induced by the distribution of pT†. Then,
R(p˜)=W(p˜)=
∫ p¯
p∗
W(p)E
[
e−r2T
† |pT†=p
]
ϕ(dp)
≤
∫ p¯
p∗
R(p)E
[
e−r2T
† |pT†=p
]
ϕ(dp)<
∫ p¯
p∗
R(p)ϕ(dp)=R(p˜).
The first equality follows from the contradiction assumption that F(p˜)=0, the first inequality follows from
the definition of p∗ such that F(p)≤0 for all p≥p∗, the last inequality holds because 0≤W(p∗)≤R(p∗)
implies that R(p)>0 for all p>p∗, and the final equality holds because pt is a bounded martingale and
33 By convention, if {p∈SP(α):F(p)>0}=∅, we set sup{p∈SP(α):F(p)>0}=p.
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R(·) is an affine function. But then, we have an obvious contradiction, establishing Property 2.
These two properties of F immediately deliver our result. Specifically, let p∗ :=sup{p∈SP(α):F(p)>
0}. Then, Property 1 implies that F(p)>0 (and thus b(p)=0) for all p∈ (p,p∗), and Property 2 implies
that F(p)<0 (and thus b(p)=1) for all p∈(p∗,p¯).
We continue with a technical result that will be later used.
Claim OA.3. Fix a positive integer T. For any ε>0 there exists η>0 satisfying the following property:
Take any pair of adapted processes dY 1t =µ1,tdt+σdBt and dY
2
t =µ2,tdt+σdBt such that µj,t∈ [0,1]
for j=1,2 and for every t. Let P1 and P2 be the probability distributions over (C([0,T ]),B(C([0,T ])))34
generated by such stochastic processes. IfA∈B(C([0,T ])) is such that EP1[IA]<η then EP2[IA]<ε.
Proof. Dividing both processes by σ and subtracting the same drift from both processes if necessary we
may assume that dY 1t =dBt and dY
2
t =µ2,tdt+dBt with µ2,t∈
[−σ−1,σ−1]. Since the drift is bounded
we can invoke Girsanov’s theorem to obtain
EP2[IA]=EP1[IAMT ],
whereMT =exp
(∫ T
0 µ2,tdBt− 12
∫ T
0 µ
2
2,tdt
)
. Notice thatMT ≤Fµ2 :=exp
(∫ T
0 µ2,tdBt
)
. Since this class
of processes is uniformly integrable we can take n∗∈N such that EP1
[
Fµ2I{Fµ2>n∗}
]
< ε2 (holding for
every process in this class) and consequentlyEP1
[
MT I{MT>n∗}
]≤EP1[Fµ2I{Fµ2>n∗}]< ε2 .
Therefore, taking η= ε2n∗ , we obtain that
EP2[IA]=EP1
[
IAMT I{MT≤n∗}
]
+EP1
[
IAMT I{MT>n∗}
]≤EP1[IAMT I{MT≤n∗}]+ ε2
<n∗EP1[IA]+
ε
2
<ε.
Claim OA.4. p¯=1
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that p¯<1.
Case 1: p¯>p∗.
The belief process pt is a martingale, so for every ε>0 there exists an >0 such that if pt>p¯−, then
P(infs>tps>p∗+ε | θ=NI)>1−ε. This implies that P(T=Tλ | θ=NI)>1−εwhereTλ is the arrival
of the next Poisson-shock. Notice that for every η>0 we can take εη>0 such that the agent’s payoff at
pt is no more than (u+c)
(
r1
r1+λ
)
+η. This implies that for every ν>0 we can take η small enough (taking
εη to satisfy the condition above) so that E
(∫min{t+1,T}
t (a(pt))dt | θ=NI
)
<ν. Hence, there exists$>0
such that E
(∫min{t+1,T}
t (1−a(t))dt | θ=NI
)
>$.
34B stands for the Borel sigma-field, and C([0,T ]) is the set of continuous functions over [0,T ].
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Consider the law of motion (7) when pt∈ [p∗,p¯]. Observe that the instantaneous variance of the belief
process when the (noninvestible type) agent plays a(·) is bounded below by a positive constant times
(1−at)2min{p∗(1−p∗),p¯(1−p¯)}2 > 0. Because p¯ < 1 and because pt−p0 =
∫ t
0 dpt, we obtain that
E
[∣∣pmin{t+1,T}−pt∣∣2] ≥ % for some positive constant %, hence E[∣∣pmin{t+1,T}−pt∣∣] ≥ %. Because(
pmin{t+1,T}−pt
)
has mean zero, we obtain that E
[(
pmin{t+1,T}−pt
)+]≥ %2 . Taking ε< %4 we conclude
that P
(
pmin{t+1,T}>p¯+ ε2
)
>0, which is a contradiction.
Case 2: p¯≤p∗.
Assume p¯≤p∗. Then, b(p)=0 for all p∈SP(α,β). Claim OA.3 implies that, for every T >0, if the
noninvestible agent plays at=0 for every t∈ [0,T ], then the relationship terminates before T with probability
zero, which implies that the agent’s best response must satisfy at=0 for every t>0. This contradicts the
assumption that p¯ is never reached.
Claim OA.5. p=0.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that p>0.
Case 1: p<p∗.
Step 1: For every η∈
(
0,
p∗−p
2
)
there exists >0 such that if pt<p+ thenP(sups>tps≥p∗ | θ=NI)<η,
and consequently P(sups>tps≥p∗)<η.
This follows from the martingale property of the belief process.
Step 2: For every ε>0 and T ∈N there exists >0 such that if pt<p+ and if the agent plays a strategy
σ˜ that plays at=0 for all t>0, then Pσ˜({T<T})<ε.
This follows from Step 1 and Claim OA.3.
Step 3: There exists T ∗∈N and ε>0 such that if Pσ˜({T<T ∗})<ε, then
E
(∫ min{t+T∗,T}
t
(1−at)dt | θ=NI
)
≥1.
To see this, take an arbitrary T ∈N. If E
(∫min{t+T,T}
t (1−at)dt |θ=NI
)
<1, then agent gets no more
than
(u+c)
(∫ 1
0
r1e
−r1tds
)
+u
(∫ T
1
r1e
−r1tds
)
+(u+c)
(∫ ∞
T
r1e
−r1tds
)
<(u+c)
(∫ T
0
re−r1tds
)
for T large enough. We can thus let T ∗ be the smallest positive integer satisfying the inequality above and
then pick ε so that
(u+c)
(∫ 1
0
r1e
−r1tds
)
+u
(∫ T∗
1
r1e
−r1tds
)
+(u+c)
(∫ ∞
T∗
r1e
−r1tds
)
<(1−ε)(u+c)
(∫ T∗
0
r1e
−r1tds
)
,
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in which case E
(∫min{t+T∗,T}
t (1−at)dt |θ=NI
)
< 1 and Pσ˜({T<T ∗})<ε would imply that σ˜ is a
profitable deviation.
Step 4: There exists ∗>0 and ε∗>0 such that if:
1. pt<p+∗,
2. P(sups>tps≥p∗)<ε∗,
3. E
(∫min{t+T∗,T}
t (1−a(t))dt | θ=NI
)
≥1,
then P
(
infs>tps<p
)
>0.
The argument is analogous to that used in the Case 1 of Claim OA.4’s proof, and is thus omitted.
Step 5: Step 3 guarantees that we can find ε∗ > 0 and T ∗ such that if Pσ˜ ({T<T ∗}) < ε∗ then
E
(∫min{t+T∗,T}
t (1−at)dt |θ=NI
)
≥ 1. Steps 1 and 2 guarantee that we can find ∗ > 0 such that
if pt< p+∗ then Pσ˜({T<T ∗})<ε∗. Therefore, using Step 4, we conclude that P
(
infs>tps<p
)
> 0,
which contradicts the definition of p.
Case 2: p∗≤p. This case is analogous to the Case 2 of Claim OA.4’s proof, and is thus omitted.
Claim OA.6. In any Markovian equilibrium policy profile (a,b), limp→1a(p)<1.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that limp→1a(p) = 1. Fix an ε > 0. Take Tε ∈ N such that
e−r1Tε<ε and P(Tλ>Tε)<ε where Tλ is the random time that the next stopping opportunity arrives. Let
Z(p):=ln(p/(1−p)), for p∈(0,1). Under the contradiction assumption, take Zˆ>Z(p∗) such that z>Zˆ
implies a(z)> 12 .
35 Recall from the law of motion (9) that Zt has bounded drift. So there exists Zε>Zˆ
such that Z0≥Zε implies P
(
inft<TεZt<Zˆ |θ=NI
)
<ε.
Under the contradiction assumption, if Z0≥Zε, the payoff of the agent is no greater than
P(Tλ≤Tε)
 P(inft<TεZt<Zˆ |θ=NI)(u+c)
+P
(
inft<TεZt>Zˆ |θ=NI
)∫ Tε
0 λe
−λt(1−e−r1t)[12u+ 12(u+c)]dt

+P(Tλ>Tε)(u+c)
< (1−ε)2
(
r1
r1+λ
)(
1
2
u+
1
2
(u+c)
)
+
[
1−(1−ε)2
]
(u+c)
<
(
r1
r1+λ
)
(u+c)
for ε small, where the expression in the first line uses the fact that a(z)> 12 for z > Zˆ. This leads to a
contradiction as the agent can guarantee him a payoff of
(
r1
r1+λ
)
(u+c) by never mimicking.
35 Here, p∗ is the principal’s equilibrium termination threshold delivered by Claim OA.2. It satisfies p∗<1, for
otherwise the principal would never stop the game and the agent would choose at=0, to which the principal’s best
reply would be to stop when p is close to 1.
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Claim OA.7. In any Markovian equilibrium policy profile (a,b), limp→0a(p)<1.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that limp→0a(p) = 1. Fix an ε > 0. Under the contradiction
assumption, take Zˆ < Z(p∗) such that Z < Zˆ implies a(Z) > 12 .
36 By Claim OA.3 and because Zt
has bounded drift, there exists Zε< Zˆ such that Z0 <Zε implies P
(
supt<TεZt≥Zˆ |θ=NI
)
<ε and
Pσ˜
(
supt<TεZt≥Zˆ |θ=NI
)
<ε where σ˜ is the strategy that prescribes at=0 for every t>0.
Under the contradiction assumption, if Z0<Zε, the payoff of the agent is no greater than
P
(
sup
t<Tε
Zt<Zˆ |θ=NI
)(
ε
[(
1
2
)
(u+c)+
(
1
2
)
u
]
+(1−ε)(u+c)
)
+P
(
sup
t<Tε
Zt≥Zˆ |θ=NI
)
(u+c)
< (1−ε)
(
ε
[(
1
2
)
(u+c)+
(
1
2
)
u
]
+(1−ε)(u+c)
)
+ε(u+c).
On the other hand, the strategy σ˜ yields a payoff at least as large as (1−ε)2(u+c). So taking ε such that
(1−ε)
(
ε
[(
1
2
)
(u+c)+
(
1
2
)
u
]
+(1−ε)(u+c)
)
+ε(u+c)<(1−ε)2(u+c),
we conclude that the agent can profitably deviate by playing σ˜.
Proof of Lemma 1. That SP(α) = (0,1) follows directly from Claims OA.4 and OA.5. Consequently,
a(p)<1 for all p∈ (0,1), for otherwise there would be an absorbing state, contradicting SP(α)=(0,1).
By definition of an Markovian equilibrium, a(·) is piecewise Lipschitz, so a(·) only has finite discontinuities
and its one-sided limit always exists. Hence, supp∈(0,1)a(p) < 1 if and only if limp→1a(p) < 1 and
limp→0a(p)<1, so by Claims OA.6 and OA.7 we are done.
Proof of Lemma 2. Take any Markov equilibrium (a,b). By Claim OA.2 and Lemma 1, b has a cutoff
structure on (0,1). So we only need to argue that the cutoff belief p∗ satisfies 0< p∗ < 1. First, since
R(p)<0 for all p∈(0,p∗∗), principal’s optimality requires that b(p)=0 for all such p, and so p∗≥p∗∗>0.
Moreover, since W is bounded above by λr2+λwNI ,
37 R(p)>W(p) for all p ∈ (pH,1), so principal’s
optimality requires that b(p)=1 for all p∈(pH,1), and thus p∗≤pH<1.
B.1.2 Properties of a∗+(x) and a∗−(x)
Proof of Claim 9. Recall the definition of a∗−(·) and a∗+(·) in (38) and (39). In this proof, we focus on the
properties of a∗+(·), which is the more difficult case. The properties of a∗−(·) can be established analogously.
36 Note that p∗≥p∗∗>0.
37 Recall thatW(p) is the principal’s value at p conditional on the stopping opportunity not arriving.
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For ease of notation, define q :=
x− r1
r1+λ
u
√
κR
and qR :=
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
. Consequently, we can rewrite a∗+(·) as
a∗+(x(q))=1−
√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(q)√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(qR)+Φ(qR)−Φ(q)
.
First, notice that
qR=
√
2
r1+λ
(
1− r1+λ
ξRµ2
)
µ=
√
2
r1+λ
(
1−1+ξR
2
)
µ>
µ√
2(r1+λ)
, (49)
where the first equality uses the definition of vR in (29) and the fact that κR=
r21c
2
2(r1+λ)µ2
, and the rest follows
from the fact that ξR is the positve root of ξ2+ξ=
2(r1+λ)
µ2
so that r1+λ
ξRµ2
= 1+ξR2 <
1
2 .
Next, notice that given (49), we have[√
2(r1+λ)
µ
φ(q)+Φ(q)
]′
=φ(q)
[
1−
√
2(r1+λ)
µ
q
]
<0, ∀q∈ [qR,∞). (50)
Now, let us take derivative of 1−a∗+(x(q)) with respect to q. Using the fact that φ′(q)=−qφ(q), we have

√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(q)√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(qR)+Φ(qR)−Φ(q)
′=−
√
2(r1+λ)
µ qφ(q)
[√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(qR)+Φ(qR)−Φ(q)
]
+
√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ
2(q)[√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(qR)+Φ(qR)−Φ(q)
]2
=
√
2(r1+λ)
µ
φ(q)
−q
[√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(qR)+Φ(qR)−Φ(q)
]
+φ(q)[√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(qR)+Φ(qR)−Φ(q)
]2 .
So the sign of a∗′+(x(q)) is the same as that of
S(q):=q
[√
2(r1+λ)
µ
φ(qR)+Φ(qR)−Φ(q)
]
−φ(q).
Note that, given condition (49), we have S(qR)=
[√
2(r1+λ)
µ qR−1
]
Φ(qR)>0.Moreover, given condition
(50), we have S′(q)=
[√
2(r1+λ)
µ φ(qR)+Φ(qR)−Φ(q)
]
>0. Therefore, S(q)>0 for all q≥qR, implying
a∗+(·) is strictly increasing on [vR,vL].
Finally, inspecting (39) we have a∗+(vR)=0; applying condition (50) we have 0<a∗+(vR)<1.
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B.1.3 Translation Invariance
The analysis in Claim 8 implies that value function and pseudo-best reply of the agent is translation-invariant:
Should the principal displace her threshold from z∗ to say z∗+, then the agent’s previous value and mixing
behavior at z would coincide with the new value and mixing behavior at z+. More formally, this an
implication of the (more general) translation invariance of agent’s payoff function in the z-space.
Lemma OA.1 (Translation Invariance). Fix an arbitrary strategy profile (α,β) and some ∈R. Consider
a new profile (α′,β′), defined by α′t := αt
∣∣∣{Zs−}s≤t and β′t := βt∣∣∣{Zs−}s≤t . Then, the payoff of the
noninvestible agent satisfies
E{U1(t,α,β)|Z0 =z}=E
{
U1(t,α
′,β′)
∣∣Z0 =z+},
almost surely, for all t≥0 and z∈R.
Proof. The law of motion of the process {Zt}t≥0 from the perspective of the noninvestible agent is:
dZt=
1
2µ
2(1−αt)2dt+µ(1−αt)dBt.
This means that, if the principal perturbs her strategy using a constant displacement, the agent can maintain
his distribution of payoffs intact by imitating the perturbation.
The payoff of the principal is not translation-invariant in the z-space. Note, however, that we can write
her payoff conditioning on the type of the agent:
U2(t,α,β)=ptE{U2(t,α,β)|θ=NI}+(1−pt)E{U2(t,α,β)|θ=I}.
The conditional payoff inside the outer expectation satisfy a conditional translation invariance property.
Lemma OA.2 (Conditional Translation Invariance). Fix an arbitrary strategy profile (α,β) and some ∈R.
Consider a new profile (α′,β′), defined by α′t := αt
∣∣∣{Zs−}s≤t and β′t := βt∣∣∣{Zs−}s≤t for all t≥ 0.
Then, the conditional payoffs of the principal satisfy
E{U2(t,α,β)|θ=NI,Zt=z}=E
{
U2(t,α
′,β′)
∣∣θ=NI,Zt=z+},
E{U2(t,α,β)|θ=I,Zt=z}=E
{
U2(t,α
′,β′)
∣∣θ=I,Zt=z+},
almost surely, for all t≥0 and z∈R.
Proof. In the case of conditioning on θ=NI, the law of motion of {Zt}t≥0 is as in the proof of Lemma OA.1.
In the case of conditioning on θ=I, the dynamics of {Zt}t≥0 satisfies
dZt=−12µ2(1−αt)2dt+µ(1−αt)dBt.
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In both cases the dynamics are linear givenα, so if the agent perturbs his strategy using a constant displacement
in z−space, the principal can maintain her payoff distribution intact by imitating the perturbation.
B.1.4 Monotonicity and Curvature of Value Functions
Proof of Corollary 3. We first establish the claimed properties ofW(·). From the law of motion of pt given
by (4), we know that the diffusion coefficient converges to 0 as p→ 0 or p→ 1. So it is easy to verify
that limp→0W(p) = 0 and limp→1W(p) = λr2+λwNI . Also, since the principal can always ignore any
information, W(p) is bouneded below by W(p)≡ λr2+λmax{0,R(p)}. Then, from the principal’s HJB
given by (8), we always haveW ′′(p)≥0 no matter whetherW(p)>R(p) orW(p)<R(p); that is,W(·)
is convex on (0,1). Since limp→0W(p) = 0 and W(·)≥ 0, W(·) must be (weakly) increasing at 0, and
because it is convex,W(·) is increasing on (0,1).
Now we turn to v(·). Suppose first that r1 ≥ r∗, so that in equilibrium a(·)≡ 0. From Claim 2 and
conditions (34) and (36), v(·) is strictly decreasing and concave on (−∞,z∗), with limz→−∞v(z)=u+c.
From Claim 3 and conditions (35) and (37), v(·) is strictly decreasing and convex on (z∗,∞), with
limz→∞v(z) = r1r1+λ(u+c). Suppose now that r1 < r
∗, so that in equilibrium a(·) is humped-shaped.
In light of Claims 2 and 3 and conditions (22), (25), (28) and (31), it suffices to show that v(·) is strictly
decreasing and concave on (zL,z∗), and strictly decreasing and convex on (z∗,zR). But these properties follow
immediately from Claim 1 and the fact that a(·) is humped-shaped with 0<a(z)<1 for z∈(zL,zR).
B.2 Omitted Proofs for Theorem 2
Proof of Lemma 7. Recall from the proof of Claim 8 that r1 <r∗ implies vR<vL. Then by Claim 10
and Corollary 5, we are done if we can find an λ2≥λ1 and an r such that λ>λ2 and r1<r imply that
a∗−(u;r1)<a∗+(u;r1,λ).
Using (38) and (39), we have
a∗−(u;r1)<a
∗
+(u;r1,λ)
⇐⇒
√
2
µ φ(0)√
2r1
µ φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
+Φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
−Φ(0)
>
1√
r1
φ
(√
2
r1+λ
λµ
r1c
u
)
φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
+ µ√
2(r1+λ)
[
Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−Φ
(√
2
r1+λ
λµ
r1c
u
)]
(51)
Since φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
≤φ(0) and Φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
≤1, we can find a lower bound for the LHS of (51) whenever r1<1:
√
2
µ φ(0)√
2r1
µ φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
+Φ
(
vL−u√
κL
)
−Φ(0)
≥
√
2
µ φ(0)√
2
µ φ(0)+1−Φ(0)
.
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Now let us find an upper bound for the RHS of (51). First, when λ≥1, we know
1√
r1
φ
(√
2
r1+λ
λµ
r1c
u
)
≤ 1√
r1
φ
(√
2
r1+1
µ
r1c
u
)
. (52)
Second, by direct calculation we have
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
=
√
2µ
4
(
3√
λ+r1
+
√
1
r1+λ
+
8
µ2
)
,
and when λ≥1, we have
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
≤
√
2µ
4
(
3√
1+0
+
√
1
1+0
+
8
µ2
)
=
√
2
4
(
3µ+
√
µ2+8
)
.
Then
φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
≥φ
(√
2
4
(
3µ+
√
µ2+8
))
. (53)
Third,
µ√
2(r1+λ)
[
Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−Φ
(√
2
r1+λ
λµ
r1c
u
)]
≥− µ√
2λ
(1−Φ(0)).
Apparently, there exists λ≥λ1, such that for all λ>λ, we have
φ
(√
2
4
(
3µ+
√
µ2+8
))
− µ√
2λ
(1−Φ(0))≥ 1
2
φ
(√
2
4
(
3µ+
√
µ2+8
))
. (54)
Defining λ2 =max{1,λ} and applying conditions (52), (53) and (54), we know that whenever λ>λ2,
we have the following upper bound for the RHS of (51):
1√
r1
φ
(√
2
r1+λ
λµ
r1c
u
)
φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
+ µ√
2(r1+λ)
[
Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−Φ
(√
2
r1+λ
λµ
r1c
u
)]≤ 1√r1φ
(√
2
r1+1
µ
r1c
u
)
1
2φ
(√
2
4
(
3µ+
√
µ2+8
)) .
Now we compare the lower bound for the LHS of (51) with the upper bound for the RHS of (51). Taking
limit r1→0, we have
lim
r1→0
1√
r1
φ
(√
2
r1+1
µ
r1c
u
)
1
2φ
(√
2
4
(
3µ+
√
µ2+8
))=0<
√
2
µ φ(0)√
2
µ φ(0)+1−Φ(0)
,
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recalling that φ is the pdf of the standand normal distribution. So there exists r′>0 such that for all r<r′,
1√
r1
φ
(√
2
r1+1
µ
r1c
u
)
1
2φ
(√
2
4
(
3µ+
√
µ2+8
))<
√
2
µ φ(0)√
2
µ φ(0)+1−Φ(0)
.
Letting r=min{1,r′,r∗}, we have a?−(u;r1)<a?+(u;r1,λ) whenever λ>λ2 and r1<r, as desired.
Proof of Claim 11. Note that
a∗+(u;r1,λ)=1−
1
φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
+ µ√
2(r1+λ)
[
Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−Φ
(√
2
r1+λ
λµ
r1c
u
)] 1√
2pi
e
− λ2
λ+r1
µ2
r21c
2 u
2
.
(55)
Note also that, for all λ>λ1,
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
=
√
2µ
4
(
3√
λ+r1
+
√
1
λ+r1
+
8
µ2
)
≤
√
2µ
4
(
3√
λ1
+
√
1
λ1
+
8
µ2
)
Thus for all λ>λ1,
φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
+
µ√
2(r1+λ)
[
Φ
(
vR− r1r1+λu√
κR
)
−Φ
(√
2
r1+λ
λµ
r1c
u
)]
≥ φ
(√
2µ
4
(
3√
λ1
+
√
1
λ1
+
8
µ2
))
− µ√
2λ
. (56)
LetA′ to be such that
1√
2piA′
=
1
2
φ
(√
2µ
4
(
3√
λ1
+
√
1
λ1
+
8
µ2
))
.
Since limλ→∞ µ√2λ =0, there must exist λ
′
3≥λ1, such that for all λ>λ′3,
φ
(√
2µ
4
(
3√
λ1
+
√
1
λ1
+
8
µ2
))
− µ√
2λ
>
1√
2piA′
. (57)
Finally, letA=max{A′,2}. Conditions (55), (56) and (57) then tell us that whenever λ>λ′3, we have
a∗+(u;r1,λ)>1−A′e
− λ2
λ+r1
µ2
r21c
2 u
2
≥1−Ae−
λ2
λ+r1
µ2
r21c
2 u
2
,
as desired.
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B.3 Omitted Proofs for Theorem 3
Proof of Claim 17. The proof is almost identical to Lemma OA.5’s proof in the next section, and is thus
omitted.
B.4 Patient Limit: Toward a Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 4 which is about the convergence of equilibrium value functions when
players get arbitrarily patient at comparable rates.
For each n∈N, take the unique Markov equilibrium (an,bn) associated with the discount factor ri,n
for i=1,2. Assume that limn→∞ri,n=0 and limn→∞(r2,n/r1,n):=χ∈(0,∞). Let Vn(·) be the agent’s
value function in the equilibrium (an,bn) and Wn(·) be the principal’s value function. We will often use
z ≡ log(p/1−p) as state variable when analyzing the agent’s behavior. When doing so, we denote by
vn(z):=Vn(p(z)) the agent’s value function in the z−space. Write z∗n for the principal’s equilibrium cutoff.
Write zL,n for the infimum belief z at which the agent plays an(z)>0 and write zR,n for the supremum.
Write T for the equilibrium stopping time that stops the play of the game. Without labeling explicitly, we
note that the distribution of T depends on n and the current state z. For i=1,2, let Eθn
{
e−ri,nT
}
be the
expected discount factor when the stopping action is taken in the equilibrium (an,bn) discounted at rate ri,n
and given the equilibrium strategy of type θ∈{NI,I}.38 When the game starts at state z, let
En
{
e−ri,nT
}
:=p(z)ENIn
{
e−ri,nT
}
+(1−p(z))EIn
{
e−ri,nT
}
.
Claim OA.8. Take (r1,r2)∈R2++ and let τ be any stopping time. Assume that E{e−r1τ}=ξ∈(0,1).
i) If r2≤r1 then
ξ≤E{e−r2τ}≤ξ(r2/r1).
ii) If r2>r1 then
ξ(r2/r1)≤E{e−r2τ}≤ξ.
Moreover, for each ξ∈(0,1) and any inequality above, there exists a distribution over stopping times for
which this inequality is tight.
Proof. Assume that E{e−r1τ}=ξ∈(0,1). Let F be the CDF of τ . Let y=e−r1τ andH be its CDF. We
have τ=−(logy)/r1 and hence
∫∞
0 e
−r2tdF(t)=
∫ 1
0 y
(r2/r1)dH(y).
i) Suppose that r2≤r1. On the one hand, since y(r2/r1) is concave, we have∫ 1
0
y(r2/r1)dH(y)≤
(∫ 1
0
ydH(y)
)(r2/r1)
=ξ(r2/r1),
with equality ifH has an atom of mass one.
38 Here, we interpret the strategy of the investible type as always setting a=1.
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On the other hand, y(r2/r1) ≥ y for every y ∈ [0,1] and hence ∫ 10 y(r2/r1)dH(y)≥ ∫ 10 ydH(y), with
equality if the support ofH is {0,1}.
ii) Suppose that r2≥r1. On the one hand, since y(r2/r1) is convex, we have∫ 1
0
y(r2/r1)dH(y)≥
(∫ 1
0
ydH(y)
)(r2/r1)
=ξ(r2/r1),
with equality ifH has an atom of mass one.
On the other hand, y(r2/r1) ≤ y for every y ∈ [0,1] and hence ∫ 10 y(r2/r1)dH(y)≤ ∫ 10 ydH(y), with
equality if the support ofH is {0,1}.
Claim OA.9. For every ε> 0 there exists z† ∈R and n˜1 ∈N such that, if z≥ z† and n≥ n˜1, then the
continuation payoff of the agent at z is less than ε in the equilibrium (an,bn).
Proof. Otherwise we can find a sequence of equilibria (an,bn) starting at (zn) → +∞ in which the
agent obtains a payoff weakly greater than ε. Since the agent’s equilibrium payoff is bounded above by
(u+c)
[
1−ENIn
(
e−r1,nT
)]
, we have
(u+c)
[
1−ENIn
(
e−r1,nT
)]
≥ε ⇒ ENIn
(
e−r1,nT
)
≤
(
1− εu+c
)
,
and hence the principal’s payoff in equilibrium (an,bn) at zn is at most
max
{(
1− εu+c
)
,
(
1− εu+c
)(r2,n/r1,n)}
p(zn)wNI,
which is always strictly less than wNI . Meanwhile, since r2,n→0 and zn→∞ as n→∞, the principal’s
payoff at zn by terminating the relationship in the first opportunity satisfies
lim
n→∞
(
λ
r2,n+λ
)
[(1−p(zn))wI+p(zn)wNI]=wNI.
So the principal has a profitable deviation when n is sufficiently large.
We assume that n≥n˜1 for the remainder of this proof.
Claim OA.10. For every fixed z0, we have limsupn→∞vn(z0)≤u.
Proof. Take any small ε∈(0,u/2). For each n∈N, let znε :=inf{z|an(z)=1−ε}. There are two cases to
consider. Let z† be defined and delivered by Claim OA.9. Every sequence can be split into (at most) two
subsequence, each one of them satisfying one of the cases below.
Case 1 znε ≤z† for every n∈N.
In this case, takem∈N such that z†−m<z0 and let zn0 :=znε −m. Since vn(·) is decreasing, it suffices
to show that limsupn→∞vn(zn0 )≤u.
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Take any ζ>0. Suppose that the game starts at zn0 and consider the stopping time Tˆn that stops the play
of the game at the first time Zn(t) = znε (setting Tˆn = +∞ if this event does not happen in finite time).
Note that Zn(t) is a submartingale under the strategy of the noninvestible type and that an(z)≤1−ε with
probability one before Tˆn. Using this observation and Zn(t)’s law of motion (9), it is straightforward to show
that Tˆn<+∞ with probability one under the strategy of the noninvestible type and that ENIn
[
e−r1,nTˆn
]
→1.
Take n∗∗∈N for which n>n∗∗ implies ENIn
[
e−r1,nTˆn
]
>1−ε. Next notice that, at the state znε , vn is
decreasing and concave (by Corollary 3), and hence
r1,nvn(z
n
ε )=r1,n[u+(1−an(znε ))c]+
1
2
µ2[1−an(znε )]2
[
v′(an(znε ))+v
′′(an(znε ))
]
≤r1,n[u+(1−an(znε ))c],
which implies vn(zεn)≤u+εc, because an(zεn)=1−ε. It follows that the payoff of the noninvestible type
converges to a number not greater than (1−ε)(u+εc)+ε(u+c), which proves the result as ε is arbitrary.
Case 2 znε >z† for every n∈N.
We may assume that z0<z† for every n as otherwise the claim follows from Claim OA.9. Suppose that
the game starts at z0 and consider the stopping time Tˆn that stops the play of the game at z†. As in Case
1, we have Tˆn<+∞ with probability one under the noninvestible-type’s strategy and ENIn
{
e−r1,nTˆn
}
→1.
Since limsupn→∞vn
(
z†
)≤ε<u/2, the rest of the proof follows the same argument as in Case 1.
Claim OA.11. limn→∞zL,n=−∞.
Proof. The proof follows verbatim from Claim 14’s proof.
Lemma OA.3. For every z0< liminfz∗n, we have limn→∞an(z0)=1.
Proof. By Claim OA.11, z0∈(zL,n,z∗n) for n sufficiently large. Then from condition (18), we know that
an(·) eventually satisfies the following differential equation
a′n(z)=1−an(z)−2
(
vn(z)−u
c
)
. (58)
Assume toward a contradiction that we can find a subsequence such that limn→∞an(z0)= a¯<1. Take
m∈N such that 1−a¯4 m> 2. Claim OA.11 implies that [z0−m,z0]⊂ (zL,n,z∗n) for n sufficiently large.
Claim OA.10 and the monotonicity of vn(·) imply that we can find n†∈N such that for every n≥n†, for
every z∈ [z0−m,z0], we have 2
(
vn(z)−u
c
)
< 1−a¯4 . Given the contradiction assumption, we can find n
†∈N
such that for every n≥n† we have an(z0)< 1+a¯2 . Since an(·) is strictly increasing on [z0−m,z0], this
implies an(z)< 1+a¯2 for all z∈ [z0−m,z0]. So (58) implies a′n(z)> 1−a¯4 for all z∈ [z0−m,z0] and hence
an(z0−m)<an(z0)− 1−a¯4 m<an(z0)−2<0,
which leads to a contradiction as an is bounded below by 0.
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Lemma OA.4. For every z0< liminfn→∞z∗n, we have limn→∞vn(z0)=u.
Proof. By Claim OA.11, z0∈(zL,n,z∗n) for n sufficiently large. Take ϑ>0 such that z0+2ϑ< liminfz∗n
and, taking a subsequence if necessary, assume that z0+ϑ<z∗n for each one of its elements.
Assume toward a contradiction, taking a subsequence if necessary, that limn→∞vn(z0)<u−ε, for some
ε>0. Because vn(·) is strictly decreasing, we may take n∗ such that n≥n∗ implies vn(z)<u− ε2 for all
z∈[z0,z0+ ϑ2]. In this case, we have
a′n(z)=1−an(z)−2
(
vn(z)−u
c
)
≥ εc
for every z∈[z0,z0+ ϑ2]. This implies that limsupnan(z0)≤1−(ϑ2)εc , contradicting Lemma OA.3.
Lemma OA.5. Fix a prior p0∈(0,1) and some p¯∈(p0,1). For each r>0, consider an adapted Markov
function αr(·) and a belief process defined by substituting αr(·) into (7). Take ε>0 and let T¯ be the random
time that stops the play in the first time that p≥ p¯. Then we have:
limsup
r↓0
ENI
{
r
∫ T¯
0
e−rtI{αr(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
=0.
Proof. Take a small >0. Next, take ζ>0 and let Tζ be the stopping time that stops the play in the first
time that the posterior reaches (ζ,p¯)c. Using the margingale property of beliefs whose law of motion is given
by (7), it is straightforward to show that we can take ζ small enough so that
PNI
{
Tζ<∞,p(Tζ)=ζ
}
<

2
.
Therefore, we have:
ENI
{
r
∫ T¯
0
e−rtI{αr(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
= ENI
{
r
∫ T¯
0
e−rtI{inft≤T¯pt≤ζ}I{αr(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
+ENI
{
r
∫ T¯
0
e−rtI{inft≤T¯pt>ζ}I{αr(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
≤ 
2
+ENI
{
r
∫ T¯
0
e−rtI{inft≤T¯pt>ζ}I{αr(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
≤ 
2
+ENI
{
r
∫ Tζ
0
e−rtI{αr(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
≤ 
2
+ENI
{
r
∫ Tζ
0
I{αr(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
.
We must then show that limsupr↓0ENI
{
r
∫ Tζ
0 I{αr(pt)≤1−ε}dt
}
< 2 . Let ξr(t) be a function that is 1
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whenever ar(pt)≤1−ε and 0 otherwise. It suffices to show that limsupr↓0rENI
{∫ Tζ
0 ξr(t)dt
}
< 2 .
For that we will consider a different stopping time T∗ and a new process ξ∗r(t) which are built from Tζ and
ξr(t) in the following way. Whenever Tζ<∞ and
∫ Tζ
0 ξr(t)dt∈(m−1,m) for somem∈N, we will set
ξ∗r(t):=
ξr(t) t≤Tζ,1 t>Tζ.
We will also set T∗ := Tζ + t˜, where t˜ is defined by
∫ Tζ
0 ξr(t)dt+ t˜ = m. Whenever T
ζ < +∞ and∫ Tζ
0 ξr(t)dt=m−1 for somem∈N, we set ξ∗r(t):=ξr(t) and T∗ :=Tζ. Clearly it suffices to show that
limsup
r↓0
ENI
{
r
∫ T∗
0
ξ∗r(t)dt
}
<

2
.
Next, we build a family of stochastic processes
{
ξ∗r,m(t)
}
m∈N from ξ
∗
r(t) by setting
ξ∗r,m(t):=
ξ∗r(t)
∫ t
0ξ
∗(t)dt∈(m−1,m],
0 otherwise.
This immediately implies that rENI
{∫ T∗
0 ξ
∗
r(t)dt
}
=r
∑∞
m=1ENI
{∫ T∗
0 ξ
∗
r,m(t)dt
}
.
Next, observe that, conditional on θ=NI, pt is a bounded submartingale. Thus, for any adapted function
ξ˜(t)∈{0,1} and any stopping time T˜, we have
1≥pT−p0 =ENI
[∫ T
0
dpt
]
=ENI
[∫ T
0
ξ˜(t)dpt
]
+ENI
[∫ T
0
(
1−ξ˜(t)
)
dpt
]
≥ENI
[∫ T
0
ξ˜(t)dpt
]
because
(
1−ξ˜(t)
)
being an adapted process and pt being a submartingale jointly imply thatENI
[∫ T
0
(
1−ξ˜(t)
)
dpt
]
≥
0. As a result, we have
1≥ENI
[∫ T
0
ξ∗r(t)dpt
]
=
∞∑
m=1
ENI
[∫ T
0
ξ∗r,m(t)dpt
]
. (59)
Next, since 0<ζ < p¯< 1, from condition (7) it is straightforward to show that there exists a positive
constant ϑ>0 such that, for anym∈N, we have
ENI
{∫ T∗
0
ξ∗r,m(t)dpt
}
≥ϑENI
{∫ T∗
0
ξ∗r,m(t)dt
}
. (60)
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Therefore, combining (59) and (60) we have
∞∑
m=1
ENI
{∫ T∗
0
ξ∗r,m(t)dt
}
≤ 1
ϑ
∞∑
m=1
ENI
{∫ T∗
0
ξ∗r,m(t)dpt
}
≤ 1
ϑ
,
implying that
∑∞
m=1rENI
{∫ T∗
0 ξ
∗
r,m(t)dt
}
≤ rϑ , which is smaller than 2 when r is sufficiently small.
Lemma OA.6. limn→∞z∗n=z∗∗.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that we can find a subsequence for which limn→∞z∗n := z¯ >z∗∗.
Let zm be the midpoint between z¯ and z∗∗. Take ε> 0. Consider the game starting at zm. Notice that
Lemma OA.4 implies that limn→∞vn(zm)=u, while Lemma OA.5 implies that, for each ν>0, we have
lim
n→∞E
NI
n
{
r1,n
∫ T
0
e−r1,ntI{an(zt)≤1−ν}dt
}
=0.
These two observations imply that limn→∞ENIn
(
e−r1,nT
)
= 0, which, by the same argument as Claim
OA.8’s proof, implies that limn→∞ENIn
(
e−r2,nT
)
=0; that is, conditional on θ=NI, the principal derives
zero discounted payoff from the game. It follows that the principal obtains a limit payoff bounded above
by zero at zm. But then, for n sufficiently large, if the stopping opportunity arrives at z=zm, the principal
can profitably deviate by stopping the game to obtain p(zm)wNI+(1−p(zm))wI>0, a contradiction.
Lemma OA.7. For every z0>z∗∗ and i=1,2, we have limn→∞En
{
e−ri,nT
}
=1.
Proof. Fix z0 > z∗∗. By Claim OA.8, it suffices to show that limn→∞En
{
e−r2,nT
}
= 1. Taking a
subsequence if necessary, assume toward a contradiction that limn→∞En
{
e−r2,nT
}
<1.
Let τ˜ be the stopping time that stops the play in the first time that either the state reaches [0,p(z∗n)] or when
T happens. Let x=e−r2,nt. LetQn be the distribution of pτ˜ andHn(· |pτ˜) be the conditional distribution
of x given pτ˜ .
Step 1. We show that the contradiction assumption implies that, the discounted amount of time that the
relationship continues with beliefs close to p(z∗n) is nonnegligible (i.e., condition (63) holds).
Note that
Wn(p(z0))=
∫ 1
p(z∗n)
∫ 1
0
x
[
I{pτ˜>p(z∗n)}R(pτ˜)+I{pτ˜≤p(z∗n)}Wn(p(z
∗
n))
]
Hn(dx |pτ˜)dQn(dpτ˜).
Because limn→∞Wn(p(z∗n))=limn→∞R(p(z∗n))=0, we have
limsup
n→∞
Wn(p(z0))=limsup
n→∞
∫ 1
p(z∗n)
∫ 1
0
xR(pτ˜)Hn(dx |pτ˜)Qn(dpτ˜). (61)
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Moreover, sinceR(p∗∗)=0 and p(z∗n)→p∗∗ (by Lemma OA.6), for every ε>0 there exists ζ>0 such that
when n is sufficiently large,R(p)>ζ for every p>p(z∗n)+ε. Combining this observation with condition
(61), it is easy to show that, for every ε>0, if
limsup
n→∞
∫ 1
p(z∗n)+ε
∫ 1
0
(1−x)Hn(dx |pτ˜)Qn(dpτ˜)>0,
then we would have limsupn→∞Wn (p(z0)) < R (p(z0)), which contradicts bn(z0) = 1 (principal’s
optimality) when n is sufficiently large. Hence, for every ε>0, we have
limsup
n→∞
∫ 1
p(z∗n)+ε
∫ 1
0
(1−x)Hn(dx |pτ˜)Qn(dpτ˜)=0. (62)
Therefore, the assumption that limn→∞En
(
e−r2,nT
)
<1 implies that, for every ε>0, we have
limsup
n→∞
∫ p(z∗n)+ε
p(z∗n)
∫ 1
0
(1−x)Hn(dx |pτ˜)Qn(dpτ˜)>0. (63)
For the remainder of this proof, we take ε>0 such that p(z∗n)+ε<
(
z0+z∗∗
2
)
.
Step 2. We show that condition (63) implies that, the noninvestible type has a profitable deviation by fully
mimicking the investible type.
Lemma OA.5 implies that if we let T¯m be the random time that stops the play in the first time that the
posterior leaves
(
m−1,1−m−1) or that T happens, then for each υ>0, we have
lim
n→∞E
NI
n
{
r1,n
∫ T¯m
0
e−r1,ntI{an(pt)≤1−υ}dt
}
=0.
By the martingale property of beliefs we can takem∈N large enough to make limsupn→∞PNI
{
inft≤Tpt≤m−1
}
as small as we want. Analogously, we can take m large enough to guarantee that whenever the posterior
starts at
(
1−m−1,1) then limsupn→∞PNI {inft≤Tpt≤p(z∗n)+ε} is as small as we want. These two
observations then imply that
limsup
n→∞
ENIn
{
r1,n
∫ T
0
e−r1,nt(1−an(pt))dt
}
=0. (64)
Next, let y=e−r1,nt. For θ∈{NI,I}, let Qθn stand for the distribution of pT (not pτ˜ as above) given
the strategy of type θ and letHθn(· |pT) stand for the conditional distribution of y given pT and the strategy
of type θ. On the one hand, using (62) and (64), it is straightforward to see that, taking a subsequence if
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necessary, the limit payoff of the noninvestible type from following his equilibrium strategy is given by:
lim
n→∞u
∫ p(z∗n)+ε
0
∫ 1
0
(1−y)HNIn (dy |pT)QNIn (dpT)>0, (65)
where the positive sign follows from (63). On the other hand, the limit payoff of the noninvestible type from
following the strategy of the investible type (i.e., always boosting performance with probability 1) is given by:
lim
n→∞u
∫ p(z∗n)+ε
0
∫ 1
0
(1−y)HIn(dy |pT)QIn(dpT)>0. (66)
Next, a straightforward application of Bayes rule implies thatHNIn (· |pT)=HIn(· |pT) for every pT∈(0,1).
Moreover, using p(z∗n)+ε<
(
z0+z∗∗
2
)
and Bayes rule, one can find ξ>1 such that QIn(A)≥ξQNIn (A)
for every (Borel-measurable)A⊂ [0,p(z∗n)+ε]. Hence, subtracting (65) from (66) we obtain an expression
at least as large as
lim
n→∞(ξ−1)u
∫ p(z∗n)+ε
0
∫ 1
0
(1−y)HNIn (dy |pT)QNIn (dpT)>0.
This implies that the noninvestible type can profitably deviate by fully mimicking, which leads to a contra-
diction and concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4. First, for the agent, Lemmas OA.4 and OA.6 tell us that limn→∞vn(z) =u for all
z<z∗∗, and Lemma OA.7 implies that limn→∞vn(z)=0 for all z>z∗∗.
Next, for the principal, we first argue thatWn(·) converges pointwise to max{0,R(·)}. In light of Corollary
3, we continuously extendWn(·) from (0,1) to [0,1] by settingWn(0)=0 andWn(1)= λr2,n+λwNI . Lemma
OA.7 implies that limn→∞Wn(p(z))=R(p(z)) for all z>z∗∗. We now show that limn→∞Wn(p(z))=0
for all z≤z∗∗. To see this, fix any z≤z∗∗ and take any ε>0. SinceR(p(z∗∗))=0, there exists δ>0 such
that R(p(z∗∗)+δ)< ε2 . But then, we can find n
∗ such that for every n>n∗, Wn(p(z∗∗)+δ)<ε. Since
Wn(·) is increasing, it follows thatWn(p(z))<ε for every n>n∗. So we must have limn→∞Wn(p(z))=0,
because ε is arbitrary andWn(·) is bounded below by 0.
To show uniform convergence, note that for any fixed n,Wn(·) is bounded below by λr2,n+λmax{0,R(·)}
such that Wn(1) = λr2,n+λR(1). Because Wn(·) is convex and increasing, |W ′n(·)| is bounded above by
(wNI−wI), and hence {Wn}n is uniformly equicontinuous. SinceWn converges pointwise to max{0,R},
invoking Arzela`–Ascoli theorem we conclude that the convergence is uniform.
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